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THE RISE AND FALL OF HISTORIC CHIEF JUSTICES: 
CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS AND JUDICIAL 
LEADERSHIP IN INDONESIA
By Stefanus Hendrianto
†
Abstract: In the decade following its inception, the Indonesian 
Constitutional Court has marked a new chapter in Indonesian legal history, one in which 
a judicial institution can challenge the executive and legislative branches.  This article 
argues that judicial leadership is the main contributing factor explaining the emergence of 
judicial power in Indonesia.  This article posits that the newly established Indonesian 
Constitutional Court needed a strong and skilled Chief Justice to build the institution 
because it had insufficient support from political actors.  As the Court lacked a well-
established tradition of judicial review, it needed a visionary leader who could maximize 
the structural advantage of the Court.  Finally, the Court needed a heroic leader able to 
deal with the challenges and pressures from the government.  This article examines the 
role of the four Chief Justices of the Indonesian Constitutional Court: Jimly Asshiddiqie 
(2003–2008), Mohammad Mahfud (2008–2013), Akil Mochtar (2013), and Hamdan 
Zoelva (2013–2015).  Chief Justice Jimly Asshiddiqie and Muhmmad Mahfud set a high 
bar by playing the role of heroic Chief Justices.  The departure of Asshiddiqie and 
Mahfud, however, marked the end an era of heroic Chief Justices.  Both Chief Justices 
Akil Mochtar and Hamdan Zoelva could not maintain the role of heroic Chief Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION 
When the former Chief Justice of the Indonesian Constitutional Court, 
Akil Mochtar was arrested in October 2013 for alleged bribery, his story 
immediately made international headlines.
1
It may come as a surprise to 
many that by the time of his arrest, Mochtar had held the position of Chief 
Justice for just six months.  It is clear that international communities—
†
This article could not have been written without the continuous advice and encouragement of 
Clark Lombardi, University of Washington Law School.  I would like to thank Dean Lisa Kloppenberg of 
Santa Clara University School of Law who extender her support for me to write this article during my time 
in Santa Clara.  I am grateful to Rosalind Dixon of University of New South Wales School of Law, who 
worked hard to bring me to Sydney, Australia for the Workshop on “Constitutional Court and Democracy 
in Indonesia: Judging the First Decade.”  In the workshop, I benefited from Mark Tushnet’s comments on 
the idea of a heroic court, which eventually led me to write this article.  I would like to acknowledge Luthfi 
Eddyono and Bivitri Susanti for their valuable assistance in gathering data from the Indonesian 
Constitutional Court.  Finally, special thanks to Jennie Sevedge, Tim O’Brien and Claire Harvey, who 
provided terrific editorial assistance on the earlier drafts.
1
Joe Chochrane, Top Indonesian Judge Held in Corruption Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2013 at A1; I 
Made Sentana & Joko Hariyanto, Indonesia Detains a Top Judge Over Alleged Corruption, WALL ST. J.
(Oct. 3, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303492504579113253416780; You’re 
nicked, your honour: An anti-corruption investigation touches the constitutional court, THE ECONOMIST
(Oct. 12, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21587849-anti-corruption-investigation-touches-
constitutional-court-youre-nicked-your-honour; Indonesia arrests top judge on corruption charges, BBC
NEWS (Oct. 3, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-24344995.
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especially those composed of lawyers, legal scholars and law students—
must be provided with a better narrative of the Indonesian Constitutional 
history.  Before this disgraced Chief Justice, there were two great Chief 
Justices: Jimly Asshiddiqie and Mohammad Mahfud.  These two Chief 
Justices never made international headlines like their successor, but they 
contributed extensively to the struggle for the rule of law during post-
authoritarian Indonesia, particularly in solidifying the Court as an institution.
This article examines the role of the four Chief Justices of the 
Indonesian Constitutional Court: Jimly Asshiddiqie (2003–2008), 
Mohammad Mahfud (2008–2013), Akil Mochtar (2013), and Hamdan 
Zoelva (2013–2015).  Before exploring the roles played by each of these 
four Chief Justices, clarifications are necessary.  First, this article is a study 
of judicial empowerment rather than a study of each Chief Justice’s 
personality. By judicial empowerment, this article refers to the process of 
how the Court balances power between the judicial, executive, and 
legislative branches of government.
2
In the decade following its inception, 
the Indonesian Constitutional Court has marked a new chapter in Indonesian 
legal history.  It is one in which a judicial institution can challenge the 
executive and legislative branches.  This article argues that the architects 
behind this success story were the first two Chief Justices: Jimly Asshiddiqie
and Mohammad Mahfud.  Armed with a strong leadership style, both 
Asshiddiqie and Mahfud led the Court to issue several decisions that 
challenged governmental policies and pushed the government to abide by 
the Constitution.
Second, by analyzing the role of judicial leadership, this article 
addresses the question that constitutional law scholars and political scientists 
have asked: how is a Court with no army or coercive power able to constrain 
the other branches of government?
3
  Stated otherwise, why would the 
2
Legal scholars and political scientists have come up with many different theories that explain 
judicial empowerment. See, e.g., TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES:
CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN ASIAN CASES (2003) [hereinafter GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW 
DEMOCRACIES]; RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW 
CONSTITUTIONALISM (2004); John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, Constitutional Courts as Deliberative 
Institutions: Towards an Institutional Theory of Constitutional Justice, in CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE, EAST 
AND WEST: DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY AND CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE IN A 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 21 (Wojciech Sadurski ed., 2003); ALEXI TROCHEV, JUDGING RUSSIA:
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT IN RUSSIAN POLITICS, 1990–2006 (2008).
3
See Matthew C. Stephenson, “When the Devil Turns . . .”: The Political Foundations of 
Independent Judicial Review, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 59 (2003); David S. Law, A Theory of Judicial Power and 
Judicial Review, 97 GEO. L.J. 723 (2009).
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Executive branch ever comply with the Court’s decisions?  In particular, I 
explore the question of how the Court manages to bolster its judicial power 
in a new democracy like Indonesia. This article will answer the question by 
exploring the role that the first four Chief Justices played in securing judicial 
power for the new Indonesian Constitutional Court.
This article argues that judicial leadership is the main contributing 
factor explaining the emergence of judicial power in Indonesia because of 
the Court’s inability to rely on the government to build the institution.  In the 
case of a new democracy like Indonesia, the government often creates the 
Court for the purpose of safeguarding its own interests rather than to 
safeguard constitutional principles.
4
Moreover, the government may not 
want the Court to become an institution capable of exercising robust judicial 
review out of fear that it could threaten the government’s authority.  Under 
such circumstances, the responsibility to build the Court into a functioning 
institution lies largely in the hands of the Chief Justice.  This article argues 
that until the Court has established a solid judicial tradition, it must be 
dependent on the creativity of the Chief Justices to define and shape its 
judicial power.  The first members of the Constitutional Court began their 
term with no point of reference regarding judicial review. In the absence of 
the tradition of judicial review, the Chief Justice had an important role in 
leading the Court to define the scope of its judicial power.  
Third, although this article focuses on the role of judicial leadership, it 
also implicates the study of institutional design.  One of the important 
features of judicial design is the term limit.  The term limit is a key 
component of judicial independence.  Longer appointment terms encourage 
judges to exercise their authority with more independence.
5
Limiting the 
term length to two and a half years is a weakness in the Indonesian 
Constitutional Court design.  With this limited amount of time, executives 
and lawmakers have the opportunity to dismiss any sitting judges who run 
against their specific interest and to appoint their favorite judges.
4
See GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES supra note 2; Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, 
Constitutional Borrowing and Nonborrowing, 1 INT'L J. CONST. L. 196 (2003); TAMIR MOUSTAFA, THE 
STRUGGLE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL POWER: LAW, POLITICS, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN EGYPT (2007); 
JODI S. FINKEL, JUDICIAL REFORM AS POLITICAL INSURANCE: ARGENTINA, PERU, AND MEXICO IN THE 
1990S (2008).
5
Tom Ginsburg, Economic Analysis and the Design of Constitutional Courts, 3 THEORETICAL 
INQUIRIES L. 49, 65 (2002) [hereinafter Ginsburg, Economic Analysis].
   
 
                                           
JUNE 2016 Constitutional Politics and Judicial Leadership in Indonesia 492
This article further contends that the Court needs not only a good 
structural design, but also a Chief Justice who has the vision and courage to 
lead the Court in playing an important role in constitutional politics.  The 
structural design of the Constitutional Court is an important factor that can 
strengthen judicial power.
6
  Similar to Constitutional Courts in other 
countries, the Indonesian Constitutional Court is armed with abstract review 
that enables it to rule on the conformity of a statute with the Indonesian 
Constitution.
7
In other words, the Constitutional Court may scrutinize 
policy decisions made by the government.  Nevertheless, the initial members 
of the Court did not have any reference on how the Court could scrutinize 
policy decisions.  The Court needs a visionary and courageous Chief Justice 
who can lead the Court in fulfilling this role and building precedent for 
future Constitutional Court justices.  Thus, while the analysis on institutional 
design is not intended as the primary contribution of this article, the analysis 
on the role of Chief Justice has some implications for the study of 
institutional design. 
The final point of clarification is that this article is not meant to 
suggest that in order to bolster its power, courts in a new democracy ought to 
have a “Super Chief Justice.”
8
This article makes no claim that the
experience of the Indonesian Constitutional Court can be a model for the 
development of judicial institutions in various countries.  The purpose of this 
article is rather to explain how judicial empowerment can be achieved in the 
context of Indonesian Constitutional politics.  Thus, the exploration of 
judicial empowerment through the lens of judicial leadership is meant to be 
descriptive rather than normative.  This article merely seeks to understand 
how the judicial power might be formed in post-authoritarian Indonesia.  As 
6
For a full discussion of the historical origins of the constitutional courts, see generally ALEC 
STONE, THE BIRTH OF JUDICIAL POLITICS IN FRANCE: THE CONSTITUTIONAL COUNCIL IN COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVE (1992); Klaus von Boyme, The Genesis of Constitutional Review in Parliamentary Systems,
in CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW AND LEGISLATION: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON 21 (Christine Landfried 
ed., 1988); DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF 
GERMANY 3–29 (2d ed. 1997); Stanley L. Paulson, Constitutional Review in the United States and Austria: 
Notes on the Beginnings, 16 RATIO JURIS. 223 (2003).
7
For detailed analysis of the concept of abstract review, see STONE, supra note 6; Victor Ferreres 
Comella, The Consequences of Centralizing Constitutional Review in a Special Court: Some Thoughts on 
Judicial Activism, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1705 (2004); WOJCIECH SADURSKI, RIGHTS BEFORE COURTS: A STUDY 
OF CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN POST-COMMUNIST STATES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE (2005); 
Alec Stone Sweet, The Politics of Constitutional Review in France and Europe, 5 INT’L J. CONST. L. 69 
(2007).
8
For the analysis on the role of judicial leadership in understanding the nature of judicial politics in 
Asia, see Haig Patapan, Leadership, Law and Legitimacy: Reflections on the Changing Nature of Judicial 
Politics in Asia, in THE JUDICIALIZATION OF POLITICS IN ASIA 219 (Björn Dressel ed., 2012).
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a court in a new democracy, the Indonesian Constitutional Court faces the 
risk of a counter attack from the executive and legislative branches 
whenever they are dissatisfied with the Court’s decision.  The Court, 
however, has no army that can provide protection from a potential attack.  
Consequently, it needs a “heroic” Chief Justice who can lead the institution 
to deal with the challenges and pressures from the executive and legislative 
branches. 
In sum, this article posits that the newly established Indonesian 
Constitutional Court needed a strong and skilled Chief Justice to build the 
institution, as it had insufficient support from political actors.  Moreover, as 
it lacked a well-established tradition of judicial review, it needed a visionary 
leader who could maximize the structural advantage of the Court.  It needed 
a heroic leader able to deal with the challenges and pressures from the 
government.  Finally, the Court required a skilled Chief Justice who could 
navigate the Court through the stormy waters of constitutional politics. 
This article proceeds in five parts.  Following the Introduction, Part II 
provides the conceptual stage by presenting evidence of the role of Chief 
Justice in the judicial empowerment process in different countries.  The 
importance of Chief Justices can be seen in the courts of new democracies.  
Judicial leadership assumes particular significance as the country continues 
in its democratic transition period.  For example, the democratic transition 
process in Eastern Europe witnessed the rise of two towering figures, Chief 
Justice Lazlo Solyom of the Hungarian Constitutional Court and Chief 
Justice Valery Zorkin of the Russian Constitutional Court.  In both cases, 
these Chief Justices emerged as political actors in fragmented political 
worlds.  Both of them, however, ended their terms with a disastrous exit 
after elected political leaders attempted to silence their opposition.  In a 
different context, Chief Justice Arthur Chaskalson of the Constitutional 
Court of South Africa proved to be a crucial figure in the democratic 
transition process.  Unlike the two Chief Justices from Eastern Europe, Chief 
Justice Chaskalson was able to survive a decade of his tenure without 
triggering debilitating attacks on his Court.
Part IV explores the role that the first Indonesian Chief Justice, Jimly 
Asshiddiqie, played in securing judicial power for the new Indonesian 
Constitutional Court.  Chief Justice Asshiddiqie was indeed strategic in his 
role as he sought to increase the Court’s policy-making influence.  He 
maintained the Court’s institutional position vis-a-vis other branches of 
government.  Asshiddiqie was conscientious when choosing to engage in 
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confrontation with the government and when to backtrack if the issue 
became too sensitive.  Nonetheless, the Chief Justice’s term limit made his 
position vulnerable.  Asshiddiqie, along with the Executive, was ousted by 
the associate justices of his own Court. 
Part V explains the direction adopted by Asshiddiqie’s successor, 
Chief Justice Mohammad Mahfud.  Chief Justice Mahfud came to the Court 
with a vision of strong judicial restraint and promised to employ a more 
modest leadership style than his predecessor.  Nevertheless, after Mahfud 
began in his position, he did not remain faithful to his vow of judicial 
restraint.  It is true that the Mahfud Court was keen to defer to the executive 
and legislative branches in the area of individual rights, but he also sought to 
maintain the Court’s status as a key policymaker by reviewing many 
governmental policies.  Moreover, Chief Justice Mahfud continued to 
strengthen the Chief Justice’s power by expanding its extrajudicial activities 
through giving media interviews and public statements on social and 
political issues.  As a strategic judge, Chief Justice Mahfud managed to 
avoid backlash from the other branches of government and his own associate 
justices.  Nevertheless, his own political ambition led to his early departure 
from the Court, as he aimed to occupy the office of the President.
Part VI shows the damage that was caused by the dismissal of Chief 
Justice Akil Mochtar.  Having only spent six months in office, Akil Mochtar 
was arrested by the Anti-Corruption Commission for alleged bribery.  The 
arrest of Akil Mochtar unraveled the hard work of his predecessors to build 
the Court as a functioning and transparent institution. Mochtar’s corruption 
immediately flipped public perception and insinuated that the Court was 
merely another corrupt legal institution in the country. 
Part VII considers the performance of Chief Justice Hamdan Zoelva in 
his short tenure in the position.  Chief Justice Zoelva only stayed in office 
for a little over a year.  During his brief tenure, Chief Justice Zoelva 
continuously led the Court to advocate for judicial restraint.  Under Zoelva’s 
leadership, the Court did not show any interest in engaging in judicial review 
of strategic and politically sensitive cases.  Zoelva’s advocacy of judicial 
restraint, however, did not guarantee him a second term.  Zoelva had to 
leave the Court as President Joko Widodo decided not to reappoint him for a 
second term.
This article concludes by suggesting that the leadership of the Chief 
Justice holds a crucial role in the Indonesian constitutional constellation.  
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Chief Justice Jimly Asshiddiqie set a high bar by playing the role of a heroic 
Chief Justice.  While his successor, Mohammad Mahfud came with a vision 
of judicial restraint, he immediately followed the steps of his predecessor.  
The departure of both Asshiddiqie and Mahfud marked the end an era of 
heroic Chief Justices.  Both Chief Justice Akil Mochtar and Hamdan Zoelva 
could not maintain the role of the heroic Chief Justice.  The Court’s 
structural design consistently requires the Court to deal with constitutional 
issues that have a powerful impact in the political realm.  Consequently, the 
Court requires heroic leadership of a Chief Justice who can lead the 
institution in challenging areas involving politically sensitive issues.
II. THE ROLE OF CHIEF JUSTICE IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL 
PERSPECTIVES  
While currently there are few legal scholars and political scientists 
attempting to explain the judicial empowerment from the perspective of the 
judicial leadership, we can find evidence on the role of Chief Justice as part 
of the larger theme of the study of judicial institutions.  One major piece of 
scholarly work on the role of judicial leadership is the research from Jennifer 
Widner on the emerging constitutionalism in southern and eastern Africa.
9
In her study, Widner explores the question of how judges engaged in 
institution building.  She particularly focuses on one man, Francis Nyalali, 
the former Chief Justice of Tanzania (1976–1999). 
Widner explains the influence of Nyalali as an institutional builder 
and social engineer through his direct and strategic engagement with 
politicians and other public officials rather than through doctrinal activism.  
For example, Nyalali spent much time lobbying for judicial independence 
and democratic reform at every level.  One of his major accomplishments 
was the adoption of a code of judicial conduct modeled after the American 
Bar Association (ABA) Code of Judicial Conduct.
10
As part of his 
extrajudicial activism, Nyalali attempted to educate members of the legal 
profession on matters of constitutional interpretation.
11
With the media, 
Nyalali built mutual collaboration, periodically contributing columns on 
legal issues for newspapers and participating in other law-related educational 
9
JENNIFER A. WIDNER, BUILDING THE RULE OF LAW: FRANCIS NYALALI AND THE ROAD TO 
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN AFRICA (2001).
10
Id. at 279.
11
Id. at 314.
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initiatives on the radio and television.
12
Moreover, Nyalali built close 
connections with international donors to increase material resources for the 
judiciary.
13
Kim Lane Scheppele has conducted substantial research on the role of 
the Chief Justice in new democracies.
14
Scheppele focused her research on 
two of the first Chief Justices of Constitutional Courts in Eastern Europe:
Laszlo Solyom of the Hungarian Constitutional Court and Valerii Zorkin of 
the Russian Constitutional Court. 
Schepelle explained that both Solyom and Zorkin emerged as leaders
who led the Courts to fight against the executive power.  Neither was shy to 
challenge their governments for failures to follow the constitutional 
principles such as the right to life and the right to human dignity.  In both 
countries, politicians were unhappy with Chief Justices’ behavior and 
successfully pushed the outspoken Chief Justices out of their office.  
Nevertheless, both of them were resilient and came back triumphantly to the 
political arena after spending a few years in the political wilderness.
15
It is worth briefly exploring Scheppelle’s analysis on the role of Chief 
Justice Solyom in the early period of the Hungary Constitutional Court.  
Solyom was formally elected by his fellow justices as the Chief Justice of 
the Constitutional Court in the summer of 1990.
16
During his tenure as 
Chief Justice, Solyom made constitutional promulgations such as the notion 
of the “invisible constitution.”
17
For instance, the right to life and to human 
dignity can be found in Article 54(1) of the 1990 Constitution.  
Nevertheless, under the notion of the “invisible constitution,” Chief Justice 
Solyom explained that these rights are foundational principles of Hungarian 
constitutional law and therefore it would exist even without a reference in 
the constitutional text.  In the Capital Punishment Case, Solyom described 
the decision’s reliance on the right to human dignity as a utilization of the 
12
Id. at 322.
13
Id. at 394–95.
14
See Kim Lane Scheppele, Guardians of the Constitution: Constitutional Court Presidents and the 
Struggle for the Rule of Law in Post-Soviet Europe, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1757 (2006).
15
Id. at 1758.
16
Id. at 1776.
17
Id. at 1777.
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“‘invisible constitution’—[which is] beyond the [control of both the] 
Constitution, which is often amended . . . [, and] future constitution.”
18
Under Solyom’s leadership, the Court also struck down many laws 
related to economic issues such as property rights, entrepreneurship, 
contracts, and social security benefits.  A telling example is when the 
Hungarian government passed a severe austerity budget that aimed to cut 
social safety-net programs.  The Court declared that the government’s 
economic plan violated the principle of legal security in the Constitution 
because it did not give the citizens adequate time to adjust themselves to the 
welfare cuts.
19
After the Court’s decision on the social welfare package, the 
Government signaled that it could weaken the Court through its intervention 
in the selection process of the Constitutional Court justices.  The 
Constitutional Court justices were elected to a nine-year term in office and 
the majority of them, including Chief Justice Solyom, had been elected in 
1989 or 1990.  With the end of their nine-year terms approaching, the 
question arose as to whether the activist justices’ terms would be renewed.  
When Chief Justice Solyom’s term ended in November 1998, the 
government and parliament decided not to renew his term.  Consequently he 
left the Court and briefly disappeared from public life.
20
Scheppele argues that there are at least two factors that could 
facilitate the rise of a maverick Chief Justice like Laszlo Solyom.  The first 
factor involves the Constitutional Courts, as they have a particular function 
of judicial review that is to review the constitutionality of laws and 
18
See Alkotmánybírósága (AB) [Constitutional Court] Oct. 31, 1990, 23/1990 (Hung.) (on capital 
punishment).  For discussion of the development of the idea of “invisible constitution” in Hungarian case 
law, see Ethan Klingsberg, Judicial Review and Hungary’s Transition from Communism to Democracy: 
The Constitutional Court, the Continuity of Law, and the Redefinition of Property Rights, 1992 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 41, 78–81 (1992).
19
See Alkotmánybírósága (AB) [Constitutional Court] Jun. 30 1995, 43/1995, MK.56/1995 (Hung.) 
(on social security benefits).  The government was angry with the Court’s decisions and it threatened to 
slash the Court’s authority.  Justice Solyom, however, went to the media and explained that the Court had 
to guard the Constitution from political assaults, and the Court had to be aggressive because the 
constitutional rights of citizens had been threatened by the politicians. See Scheppelle, supra note 14, at 
1783.
20
Scheppelle, supra note 14, at 1785.  Solyom took up a guest professorship at the University of 
Cologne but later returned to Budapest to teach at the new private Catholic law school, Peter Pazmany 
University.  Nevertheless, Solyom remained popular in the public mind and when the term of the 
Hungarian President was up in the summer of 2005, Solyom ran for presidential election and was elected 
by the parliament as the Hungarian President.  He took office on August 5, 2005 and finished his term as 
President in August 2010.
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governmental decisions and actions.
21
Consequently, the Chief Justice of 
the Constitutional Court would always be in the midst of political 
controversy because the Court has to constantly review governmental 
policies and actions.
22
  Second, unlike the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme 
Court who has a role as the top administrator of the U.S. federal court 
system, the Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court has no administrative 
relations to other courts.  As a result, the Chief Justice of the Constitutional 
Court has enormous control over its own institution and the Chief Justice 
can be a public personification of the Constitutional Court.
23
In her article, Schepple compares Chief Justice Loszlo Solyom to Chief 
Justice Valery Zorkin, the first Chief Justice of the Russian Constitutional 
Court.  In his early tenure (1991–1993), Chief Justice Zorkin led the Court to 
become a powerful political actor by taking virtually every politically 
sensitive case concerning issues of jurisdiction and competencies both 
within and between branches of the federal government.
24
Overall, the 
Zorkin Court favored accepting political challenges filed by political actors 
over civil rights challenges filed by individual citizens.
25
This approach 
provided incentive to the Court to involve itself in policy disputes and to 
assert the Court’s authority as the arbiter of political disputes. 
Chief Justice Zorkin began his fall from power when he became 
involved in the major political dispute between the executive and the 
legislatures.  Initially, Chief Justice Zorkin attempted to play the role as a 
broker of a political compromise between President Yeltsin and Supreme 
Soviet Chairman Khasbulatov.
26
Chief Justice Zorkin, however, went 
further to enter the political brawls when he sided with Khasbulatov against 
Yeltsin’s proposed referendum on the constitution.  Zorkin gave a speech to 
the Supreme Soviet and argued that the referendum should be postponed.
27
Zorkin suffered significant humiliation when other members of the Court 
21
Id. at 1762–63.
22
Id. at 1764.
23
Id. at 1766.
24
See CARLA THORSON, POLITICS, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE RUSSIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 55
(2012).
25
Id. at 57–58.
26
Id. at 105–06.
27
Id. at 106–08.  After the legislatures rejected his constitutional referendum proposal, President 
Yeltsin retaliated by announcing a decree by which he would assume total responsibility for the conduct of 
affairs in Russia.  Zorkin joined Khasbulatov to denounce the speech and moreover, Zorkin convened an 
emergency session of the Constitutional Court to evaluate the constitutionality of President Yeltsin’s 
speech without waiting for a formal petition.
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rebelled against his political endeavors.  Many other justices did not agree 
with Zorkin’s initiative to bring the Court into a highly politically sensitive 
issue and they demanded Zorkin resign from his position as Chief Justice.
28
With his brethren in contempt against him, Zorkin stepped down as the 
Chief Justice and President Yeltsin issued a decree that suspended the 
Constitutional Court. 
Thorson posits that the easiest explanation of Chief Justice Zorkin’s 
tragic fall is that he did precisely what a judge should not do; he failed to 
avoid a politically sensitive issue or maintain neutrality.
29
  Instead, Zorkin 
chose to engage in extra-judicial behavior that went beyond his duty as 
Chief Justice.  He became increasingly outspoken on issues related to the 
distribution of power and engaged in extra-judicial behavior that went 
beyond constitutional interpretation.  Moreover, he involved the Court in 
“political sensitive questions,” which was far from its business.
30
The new Russian Constitutional Court reopened on January 1, 1994 
with a new Chief Justice, new rules regarding the behavior of justices, and 
new procedures for handling petitions.
31
The new Chief Justice Vladimir 
Tumanov engaged in a different strategy by avoiding high-profile 
jurisdictional disputes.  The Tumanov Court focused on civil rights issues 
and federalism questions raised by the republic and its regions.
32
  Chief 
Justice Tumanov reached the mandatory retirement age in 1997 and was 
succeeded by Marat Baglai.  Chief Justice Baglai continued Tumanov’s 
strategy of keeping the Court out of the public eye by avoiding politically
sensitive cases. 
33
As mentioned above, the analysis on the judicial leadership has 
implications on the study of institutional design.  In the case of the Russian 
Constitutional Court, the role of Chief Justice is closely related to the 
Court’s design on term limits.  When Vladimir Putin became President in 
2000, he moved to change the term limit of judges in order to protect the 
pro-executive judges like Chief Justice Baglai who would reach mandatory 
28
Scheppelle, supra note 14, at 1832.
29
THORSON, supra note 24, at 101.
30
Id.
31
Id. at 119.  The reasons for the Court’s survival are not entirely clear, but Carla Thorson provides 
some explanation on the effort of some politician to convince President Yeltsin that the court ought to 
continue.
32
Id. at 121.
33
Id. at 145.
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retirement age of seventy in 2001.  President Putin proposed to remove the 
mandatory retirement age and extend the judicial tenure from twelve to 
fifteen years.
34
While President Putin initially attempted to protect his 
friends, his political strategy was counterproductive.  Chief Justice Baglai 
lost re-election in 2003 as his brethren began to see that Putin favored him.  
In a dramatic turn, Valerii Zorkin was reelected by his colleagues as Chief 
Justice to replace Baglai, and has remained the Chief Justice for more than 
ten years.  Based on the current constitutional court procedures—there is no 
term limit or mandatory retirement age for the Chief Justice—Zorkin will 
remain in his post for a long time.
35
The role of judicial leadership can also be traced in the work of 
Theunis Roux on the Constitutional Court of South Africa (CCSA).
36
Roux’s book primarily focuses on the contextual factors that constrained the 
Constitutional Court’s exercise of its judicial power.  His work explores the 
political context of judicial review in South Africa from 1995 to 2005, which 
was under the leadership of Chief Justice Arthur Chaskalson.  Although 
Roux’s work focuses primarily on the theory of contextual factors that 
constrained the Court in exercising judicial review, one can still trace the 
role of Chief Justice Chaskalson in shaping the judicial empowerment of the 
CCSA.
37
Roux traced the journey of Chaskalson back to the Apartheid era 
when Chaskalson sublimated his opposition to Apartheid into his role as a 
human rights lawyer.
38
Chaskalson built a powerful litigation firm, the 
Legal Resources Center (LRC) with a vision of the common law as the 
repository of principles of freedom and justice that could be used by activist 
34
Id. at 147.  President Putin’s proposal was approved at the end of 2000 but was modified by the 
State Duma so that these new tenure rules would apply only to judges appointed after 1994.  In 2001, Putin 
introduced another reform that restores the mandatory retirement age of 70 (beginning in January 2005) to 
all those justices appointed after 1994.  
35
The Law provides that the term of the office of the Judge of the Constitutional Court of the 
Russian Federation shall be indefinite. The age limit for the office of the Judge of the Constitutional Court 
of the Russian Federation shall be seventy years. The age limit for the office of the Judge, however, shall 
not apply to the President of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation. See Federal’nyi 
Konstitutsionnyi Zakon o Konstitutsionnom Sude Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Federal Constitutional Law on the 
Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation], SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL'STVA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII 
[SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of Legislation] 1994, No. 13, Item 1447.
36
See THEUNIS ROUX, THE POLITICS OF PRINCIPLE: THE FIRST SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
COURT, 1995–2005 (2013).
37
See id. In his book, Roux focuses on three major elements that the Court should consider in 
exercising its powers of judicial review: the Court’s capacity to decide cases according to acceptable 
reasoning; support from the general public; and the Court’s capacity to resist attacks on its independence.
38
Id. at 221–22.
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lawyers to protect individual rights against state encroachment.
39
In June 
1994, President Nelson Mandela appointed Arthur Chaskalson as the 
President of the Constitutional Court where he remained until his retirement 
in 2005.
Ronald Dworkin had high praise for Chaskalson’s leadership, 
especially in his role as the Chief Justice in leading the Court during the 
democratic transition period.  Dworkin said: 
Since apartheid’s end, Chaskalson has rendered what is 
probably an even more important service to his country. Under 
his intellectual and administrative leadership, the Constitutional 
Court has already become one of the most influential such 
courts in the world.  The quality of its craftsmanship and the 
disciplined imagination with which it has interpreted South 
Africa’s admirable Constitution has helped to ensure a 
remarkably smooth transition from oppression to a democratic 
rule of both and law and principle . . . .
40
Roux believes Dworkin’s remarks present a causal link between the way the 
Court responded to its judicial mandate and South Africa’s relatively 
peaceful transition to democracy.
41
  Roux argues that Dworkin’s summary 
of Chaskalson’s leadership must be interpreted in light of the Court’s 
strategy on socio-economic rights, in that the judges were able to assert their 
institutional function in the post-apartheid era.
42
The Court’s approach to 
socio-economic rights contributes to democratic consolidation by subjecting 
majority rule to constitutional restraints.
43
39
Id. at 222.  Justice Chaskalson founded LRC as South Africa’s first public interest law firm to 
fight apartheid, modeling it after the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund.  Financing came 
largely from three American sources: the Ford Foundation, the Carnegie Corporation of New York, and the 
Rockefeller Brothers Fund.  See also MARK S. KENDE, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN TWO WORLDS: SOUTH 
AFRICA AND UNITED STATES 32–33 (2009); Douglas Martin, Arthur Chaskalson, Chief South African 
Jurist, Dies at 81, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/04/world/africa/arthur-
chaskalson-south-african-chief-justice-dies-at-81.html?_r=0.
40
Ronald Dworkin, Response to Overseas Commentators, 1 INT’L. J CONST. L. 651, 651–52 (2003).
41
ROUX, supra note 36, at 41.
42
Id. at 42.
43
For the scholarship of the Court’s strategy in the area of socio-economic rights see CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS DO (2001); Eric C. Christiansen, Adjudicating 
Non-Justiciable Rights: Socio-Economic Rights and the South African Constitutional Court, 38 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 321 (2007); Mark Tushnet, Social Welfare Rights and the Forms of Judicial Review, 82 
TEX. L. REV. 1895 (2004); Eric C. Christiansen, Using Constitutional Adjudication to Remedy Socio-
Economic Injustice: Comparative Lesson from South Africa, 13 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOR. AFF. 369 (2008); 
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Roux praises the Constitutional Court of South Africa as one of the 
most successful of the post-Cold War constitutional courts.  Roux believes 
the Chaskalson Court’s ability to survive until May of 2005 without any 
debilitating attacks on its independence is a remarkable achievement.
44
  In 
his book, Roux explains that there are several factors that led to the survival 
of the Chaskalson Court, but one of the key successes of the Chaskalson 
Court lay in its ability to find the balance between its role as a forum to 
bridge over the competing political forces and its consistent support for a 
range of constitutional rights.
45
Chief Justice Chaskalson was a strategic Chief Justice who knew how 
to enhance the Court’s authority by engaging in rights-based discourse while 
also fortifying the Court’s status by playing a minimalist role in some policy 
areas.  Chief Justice Chaskalson described his minimalist strategy as 
follows:
I think in the early days it’s appropriate not to decide more than 
you have to decide . . . . To that extent, then, the Court has 
indicated that it will endeavor not to decide more than it has to 
and that constitutional issue ought not to be raised if the matter 
can dealt with on other legal grounds.
46
Nevertheless, he took a maximalist view on socio-economic rights.  He 
stated that “the socio economic rights are entrenched in the Bill of Rights.  
Unless the courts resort to stratagem of declaring disputes concerning socio 
economic rights to be political questions and for that reason decline 
jurisdiction, they must confront and decide the hard cases that arise . . . .”
47
Thus, the Chaskalson Court was able to play an effective role in South 
African politics by playing a combination of minimalist and maximalist 
strategy.
Rosalind Dixon & Tom Ginsburg, The South African Constitutional Court and Socio-Economic Rights as 
“Insurance Swaps” 1–29 (U. Chi. Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 436, 2013); KATHARINE 
G. YOUNG CONSTITUTING ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS (2012).
44
ROUX, supra note 36, at 188.
45
Id. at 36.
46
Kate Kempton & Malcolm MacLaren, The Protection of Human Rights in South Africa: A 
Conversation with Justice Arthur Chaskalson, President of the Constitutional Court of South Africa, 56 U.
TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 161, 170 (1998).
47
Arthur Chaskalson, From Wickedness to Equality: The Moral Transformation of South African 
Law, 1 INT’L J. CONST. L. 590, 604 (2003).
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Ran Hirschl, in his seminal work Constitutional Theocracy, also 
includes an analysis on the importance of the Chief Justice’s position in the 
context of political control of constitutional courts and judges.
48
Hirschl’s 
analysis ranges from the Chief Justice Maher Abdul Wahed of the Supreme 
Constitutional Court of Egypt to Chief Justice Aharon Barak of the Supreme 
Court of Israel.
49
Haig Patapan also dedicated a small fraction of his 
scholarship on the rule of the Chief Justices in understanding the nature of 
judicial politics in Asia.
50
Some scholars have posited Chief Justice Ifthikar 
Muhammad Chaudhry of Pakistan as the exemplar of courage and bravery 
when he stood up against the military headed executive, General 
Musharraf.
51
Chaudhry’s suspension and house arrest then led to an 
unprecedented revolt led by Pakistani lawyers in support of judicial 
independence.
52
Thus, Chaudhry’s heroic leadership is one of the most 
striking examples of how the actions of an individual Chief Justice can have 
major implications.  
The experiences of Chief Justices from different countries provide 
important data that judicial leadership is an important factor for 
understanding the nature of judicial politics.  Moreover, the institutional 
design, including term limits and the general political landscape are factors 
that heavily influence the nature and extent of the judicial strategy that 
individual Chief Justices choose to employ.
III. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE INDONESIAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
COURT
In order to better understand the role of the Chief Justice in the 
Indonesian Constitutional Court, this part presents a brief survey of the 
Court’s history.  Historically, the Indonesian legal system is based on the 
civil law tradition of the Netherlands, under which a judge cannot invalidate 
a statute on the ground that it is unconstitutional. Within the civil law 
48
See RAN HIRSCHL, CONSTITUTIONAL THEOCRACY 85–95 (2010).
49
See id. 
50
Patapan, supra note 8, at 3.
51
See Charles Kennedy, The Judicialization of Politics in Pakistan, in THE JUDICIALIZATION OF 
POLITICS IN ASIA (Bjorn Dressel ed., 2012); Taiyyaba Ahmed Qureshi, State of Emergency: General 
Pervez Musharraf’s Executive Assault on Judicial Independence in Pakistan, 35 N.C.J. INT’L. L. & COM.
REG. 485 (2010); Shoaib A. Ghias, Miscarriage of Chief Justice: Judicial Power and the Legal Complex in 
Pakistan Under Musharraf, 35 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 985 (2010)
52
For further discussion on the “Lawyers’ Movement” in Pakistan, see Moeen H. Cheema, The 
“Chaudhry Court”: Deconstructing the “Judicialization of Politics” in Pakistan, 25 WASH. INT’L L.J. 448, 
450–55.
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tradition, Acts of Parliament are the supreme expression of the democratic 
will and consequently courts may not challenge them. Nevertheless, the 
Indonesian Supreme Court could review government regulations on the 
grounds that they violated Acts of Parliament.
53
But the judiciary was too 
weak to exercise even the limited power it had.
54
One of the major factors that contributed to the Supreme Court’s 
inability to use its limited judicial review authority was the executive’s 
control of and interference in the courts. After the New Order military 
government under the leadership of General Soeharto came to power in 
1966, the executive branch moved to control the judiciary.  The 1970 
Judiciary Law gave the Government tight control of the organizational, 
administrative, and financial aspects of the judiciary.
55
The Government 
then used this control over court administration to pressure judges into 
bowing to the interests of the government.  After some time, the Court itself 
moved into voluntary compliance in order to prove its loyalty to the 
Government.
56
For more than thirty-two years, Indonesia was under the authoritarian 
rule of General Soeharto’s military regime.  By 1998, General Soeharto was 
aging and ailing, but he gave no indication that he intended to step down in
the near future.  In March of 1998, he was sworn in as President for his 
seventh five-year term, and appointed his most trusted lieutenant, B.J. 
Habibie, as his vice president.
57
Soeharto’s seventh term in office lasted 
only two months.  He was forced to resign due to mounting popular unrest 
and a collapsed economy that he was unable to revive.  After Soeharto 
tendered his resignation on May 21, 1998, Habibie was sworn in as the new 
President on the same day.  His presidency marked the beginning of a new 
era called Reformasi (Reform).  Reformasi brought new hope for 
institutional change, including opportunities to establish an independent 
53
Law of the Republic of Indonesia, No. 14 of 1970 on the Basic Principles of the Judiciary.
54
For detailed information about the performance of the Indonesian Supreme Court, see 
SEBASTIAAN POMPE, THE INDONESIAN SUPREME COURT: A STUDY OF INSTITUTIONAL COLLAPSE (2005).
55
See id. at 111–29.  
56
See id. at 124–29.
57
See ADAM SCHWARZ, A NATION IN WAITING: INDONESIA’S SEARCH FOR STABILITY (2000). Prior 
to his appointment, Habibie had held the post of Minister of Research and Technology for twenty years.  Id.
at 71.  During his tenure as technology czar, Habibie presided over the many strategic government projects, 
ranging from aircraft manufacturing to satellite technology.  Id. In the early 1990s, Soeharto extended a 
mandate to Habibie to become more active in political arenas.  He became the Chairperson of the 
Association of Indonesian Moslem Intellectuals, Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (ICMI), a new 
center of politico-bureaucratic power within the government.  Id. at 85–86.
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judiciary with judicial review authority.
58
Habibie's administration held 
parliamentary elections in June of 1999.
Following the parliamentary elections, the People’s Consultative 
Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat or MPR) held a general 
assembly to elect a new President.  Habibie, however, did not receive 
sufficient support to run as their next presidential candidate, and 
consequently had to withdraw his bid to recapture the presidency.
59
The 
Assembly instead elected Abdurrahman Wahid, who was supported by the 
Islamist political bloc, Central Axis, as the next President.
60
Wahid was the 
long-time religious leader of a Muslim organization known as Nahdatul 
Ulama.
The General Session of the Assembly (MPR) was also the first 
opportunity for politicians to address the issue of constitutional reform, 
including the power of judicial review, in the new government.
61
The First 
General Assembly Session in 1999, and the following Session in 2000, 
however, failed to reach consensus on the establishment of a constitutional 
court with judicial review authority.  It was not until President Wahid’s 
impeachment in July 2001 that politicians began to seriously consider the 
importance of the Constitutional Court. 
Less than two years after the politicians elected Wahid as President, 
they impeached him based on the allegation that his aide used his name to 
illegally secure US 4,000,000 worth of funds from the State Logistics 
Agency.  Vice President Megawati Soekarnoputri replaced the impeached 
President Wahid. Fearing she would be subject to the same fate as Wahid, 
58
See Benny K. Harman, Perkembangan Pemikiran Mengenai Perlunya Pengujian UU Terhadap 
UUD Dalam Sejarah Ketatanegaraan Indonesia, 1945–2004 [The Development of Legal Thought on the 
Judicial Review of Act Parliament Against the Constitution in the Indonesian Constitutional History, 1945–
2004] (May 20, 2006) (unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Indonesia) (on file with author).
59
BACHARUDDIN JUSUF HABIBIE, DECISIVE MOMENTS: INDONESIA’S LONG ROAD TO DEMOCRACY
428 (2006).
60
See YANG RAZALI KASSIM, TRANSITION POLITICS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: DYNAMICS OF LEADERSHIP 
CHANGE AND SUCCESSION IN INDONESIA AND MALAYSIA 146 (2005).
61
For a detailed discussion of the Constitutional Reform process, see SIMON BUTT & TIM LINDSEY,
THE CONSTITUTION OF INDONESIA: A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS (2012); DENNY INDRAYANA, INDONESIAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM, 1999–2002: AN EVALUATION OF CONSTITUTION-MAKING IN TRANSITION
(2008); DONALD L. HOROWITZ, CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND DEMOCRACY IN INDONESIA (2013).
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Megawati proposed the creation of the Constitutional Court that could 
review impeachment motions against a sitting President.
62
While acknowledging that the Wahid impeachment was an important 
trigger for the establishment of the Constitutional Court, many scholars have 
dismissed the impeachment as the sole reason behind the creation of the 
Court, but rather there were many factors at play.
63
  Instead of dismissing 
Wahid’s impeachment, this article would like to make a distinction between 
proximate and ultimate causation of the creation of the Court.  Such 
distinction will lead us to a better understanding of the establishment of the 
Constitutional Court.  This article argues that President Wahid’s
impeachment was the proximate cause of the establishment of the 
Constitutional Court.  From a historical and political perspective, one of the 
ultimate causes of the establishment of the constitutional court was the 
culmination of the consistent demand made by lawyers, scholars, and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) to the long absence of judicial review 
in Indonesia.
64
In the early days of Soeharto’s New Order regime, the Judges 
Association and the government fought bitterly over the issue of judicial 
power and constitutional review.  Nevertheless, the Judges Association stood 
alone and did not have sufficient support to bring about such reform.  In the 
end the judges and their supporters lost.
65
Fast forward to the period after 
the fall of New Order regime, the activists and NGOs under the banner of 
Koalisi Ornop untuk Konstitusi Baru (NGOs Coalition for a New 
Constitution), proposed the establishment a Constitutional Commission, 
with some hope that the Commission will adopt judicial review.
66
The 
NGOs Coalition came out with several proposals on the establishment of an 
independent constitutional commission during the Assembly annual session 
in November 2001 including that members of the commission shall be 
62
See Stefanus Hendrianto, Institutional Choice and the New Indonesian Constitutional Court, in
NEW COURTS IN ASIA 158, 162 (Andrew Harding & Penelope (Pip) Nicholson eds., 2010).
63
Tim Lindsey, Indonesian Constitutional Reform: Muddling Towards Democracy, 6 SING. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 244, 260–61 (2002). See also Harman, supra note 58; SIMON BUTT, THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
COURT AND DEMOCRACY IN INDONESIA (2015).
64
Lindsey, supra note 63, at 261–66.
65
See POMPE, supra note 54, at 213.
66
Lindsey, supra note 63, at 266.  The Coalition comprises of 17 NGOs, including the Center for 
Electoral Reform, the Independent Election Monitoring Committee, Indonesian Corruption Watch, the 
Indonesian Legal Aid and Human Rights Association, and the Indonesian Forum for the Environment.
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democratically elected, and shall consist of independent civilians from all 
provinces, social groups, and experts.
67
It was true that judges, lawyers, and NGOs had long pushed for 
judicial independence and judicial review.  Nevertheless, civil society 
elements did not play a significant role in the creation of the Constitutional 
Court.  During the constitutional reform process, the Assembly (MPR), 
however, rejected the proposal of the Constitutional Commission and 
decided that its Working Body should be responsible for preparing 
amendments.
68
Thus, the civil society represented by NGOs had no direct 
input on the amendment process in the Assembly (MPR) at all.
On November 9, 2001, the Third General Assembly Session voted in 
favor of a constitutional amendment that created the Indonesian 
Constitutional Court and endowed it with the authority to review 
impeachment motions against the President and/or Vice President.
69
Moreover, the constitutional amendment also equipped the new Court with 
the authority to review the constitutionality of statutes, to resolve disputes 
over the powers of state institutions, to review a petition for dissolution of a 
political party, and to resolve electoral disputes.
70
It is important to note that the constitutional amendment provides that 
“[t]he judicial power shall be implemented by a Supreme Court and judicial 
bodies underneath it in the form of public courts, religious affairs courts, 
military tribunals, and state administrative courts, and by a Constitutional 
Court.”
71
Essentially, the amendment divides the judiciary, in a broad sense, 
into two parts: the “Supreme Court” and the “Constitutional Court.”  This 
model assigns different tasks to each body:  it assigns the Supreme Court the 
power of ordinary judicial functions to decide concrete cases in civil, 
criminal, and administrative matters, while it entrusts the Constitutional
Court with the specific “constitutional function,” of reviewing the validity of 
legislation.  
67
See Andrew Ellis, The Indonesian Constitutional Transition: Conservatism or Fundamental 
Change?, 6 SING. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 116, 143 (2002).
68
DENNY INDRAYANA, INDONESIAN CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM 1999–2002: AN EVALUATION OF 
CONSTITUTION-MAKING IN TRANSITION 170 (2008)
69
Undang Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia [Constitution] art. 7A.
70
Id. arts. 24(C)(1), (2).
71
Id. art. 24(2).
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With regard to judicial review, the Constitution maintains in the 
Supreme Court the authority to review ordinances and regulations made 
under any statutes.
72
At the same time, the Constitution equips the 
Constitutional Court with authority to conduct reviews of statutory 
legislation. This arrangement means that the right of judicial review is not 
uniformly given to a single court. Instead the Supreme Court and the 
Constitutional Court each share different judicial review authority, which 
this article refers to as “jurisdictional cohabitation.”
The Constitution mandated that the Government erect the new 
Constitutional Court by August 17, 2003 at the latest.
73
The Government 
and the House of Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat or DPR), 
however, did not approve the bill establishing the Constitutional Court until 
August 6, 2003, which was signed by the President on August 13, 2003.
74
Following the approval, the Government, the DPR, and the Supreme Court 
(Mahkamah Agung) had to rush to select judges for the Court before the 
Court opened its doors on August 18, 2003. 
IV. THE AMBITION, SUCCESS AND FAILURE OF THE INDONESIAN JOHN 
MARSHALL, JIMLY ASSHIDDIQIE 
Having explained the historical background of the Constitutional 
Court, this article will move to discuss leadership of the first Chief Justice of 
the Indonesian Constitutional Court, Jimly Asshiddiqie.  The 2003 
Constitutional Court Law provides that the Chief Justice and Deputy Chief 
Justice are elected by the Constitutional Court Justices.
75
The Nine 
Constitutional Court Justices were sworn in on August 16, 2003.  Soon after 
their inauguration, the nine Justices held their first meeting to elect the Chief 
Justice, and elected Jimly Asshiddiqie as the first Chief Justice.  Looking at 
Asshiddiqie’s personal background and his rise to the bench helps to explain 
why his leadership style played an important role in building the Indonesian 
Constitutional Court.
72
See id. art. 24A.
73
Id. Transitional Provision, art. III of the Fourth Amendment.
74
MAHKAMAH KONSTITUSI REPUBLIK INDONESIA [CONSTITUTIONAL COURT], MENEGAKKAN 
NEGARA HUKUM YANG DEMOKRATIS: CATATAN PERJALANAN TIGA TAHUN MAHKAMAH KONSTITUSI 
2003–2006 [TO BUILD A DEMOCRATIC STATE BASED ON RULE OF LAW: THREE YEARS OF THE INDONESIAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT: 2003–2006] (2006) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, THREE YEARS OF THE 
INDONESIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT].
75
Law of the Republic of Indonesia, No. 24 of 2003 on the Constitutional Court, art. 4(3).
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A. The Rise of Jimly Asshiddiqie:  From Academia to Judiciary 
Jimly Asshiddiqie received his doctorate in Constitutional Law from 
the University of Indonesia.  In the early 1990s, he joined Association of 
Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI), which had emerged as a new 
political force within the government.  The rise of ICMI benefited
Asshiddiqie as the Government appointed him as the Secretary to the 
Minister of Education in 1993.  Five years later, Vice President Habibie 
appointed him as his Assistant for Social Welfare and Poverty Alleviation.
76
When Habibe became President, he established the Council for 
Restoration of Security and Legal System (Dewan Penegakan Keamanan 
dan Sistem Hukum) in his attempt to overcome the political crisis in the 
country.
77
Habibie appointed Jimly Asshiddiqie as Secretary for the Council 
for Restoration. His primary duties included coordinating Cabinet ministers 
and political leaders who sat on the Council.  On February 24, 1999, Habibie 
assigned Asshiddiqie to another important position as the Coordinator for 
Legal and Statutory Reform Team, which reported directly to the 
President.
78
  There was little doubt that Asshiddiqie played a significant role 
in the legal reform process during the Habibie administration.
After his political patron Habibie lost his presidential bid in 1999, 
Asshiddiqie went back to academia to teach at the University of Indonesia. 
He returned to public service for a brief moment when the People’s 
Consultative Assembly (MPR) called him to join an expert team on the 
constitutional reform process.
79
By the time the government established the 
Constitutional Court in 2003, Asshiddiqie had established a reputation as an 
expert on constitutional law and a skillful politician.  With excellent 
credentials, he was one of the top choices to lead the new Constitutional 
Court. 
The Constitution distributes the appointment power equally among the 
three branches of the government.  The President, the House of 
76
See ZAENAL ABIDIN E. P. & LISA SUROSO,  SETENGAH ABAD JIMLY ASSHIDDIQIE: KONSTITUSI
DAN SEMANGAT KEBANGSAAN [FIFTY YEARS OF JIMLY ASSHIDDIQIE: CONSTITUTION AND THE SPIRIT OF 
NATIONHOOD] (2006).
77
Presidential Decree No. 191 of 1998. 
78
Presidential Decree No. 18 of 1999 (Feb. 24, 1999).
79
Assembly working group blasted over constitutional amendments, JAKARTA POST (Mar. 22, 
2001), http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2001/03/22/assembly-working-group-blasted-over-
constitutional-amendments.html.
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Representative, and the Supreme Court all possess authority to appoint the 
Constitutional Court Justices.
80
  In August 2003, the House of 
Representatives immediately appointed Jimly Asshiddiqie as a 
Constitutional Court justice along with the other two justices, Achmad 
Roestandi and I Gede Palguna.
81
The President appointed three justices, 
Achmad Natabaya, Abdul Muktie Fadjar, and Harjono (one name only).  
The Supreme Court appointed Laica Marzuki, Maruarar Siahaan, and 
Soedarsono (one name only) to fill the remaining three spots.  None of these 
new justices had a public profile like Asshiddiqie.  With his stellar 
reputation and political experience, Asshidiqie was elected by his colleagues 
as the first Chief Justice of the Indonesian Constitutional Court. 
B. Jimly Asshiddiqie’s Strategies to Build the Court 
Jimly Asshiddiqie transformed the Court from an institution that 
lacked both external support and infrastructure into one that is now capable 
of standing independent from the other branches of government.  
Asshiddiqie’s leadership strategies are important as they suggest the extent 
to which his style influenced the Court’s performance.  In other words, it 
shines light on whether his leadership helped the Court overcome the 
challenges and obstacles that prevented the Court from exercising its 
authority.
The first obstacle for the Court in exercising its authority was the 
statutory limitation imposed by the legislative branch.  From the beginning, 
politicians in the legislative branch did not have any intention of creating a 
Court that could exercise a robust model of judicial review.  They endowed 
the Court with the authority to review the constitutionality of statutes but not 
any governmental ordinances, regulations, or actions.
82
Furthermore, they 
only allowed the Court to review the constitutionality of statutes that were 
enacted after October 19, 1999, the date when the constitutional reform 
process began.
83
  It is now obvious that the politicians designed the Court 
with limited authority and the legislature did not want to see the Court play a 
prominent role in the Indonesian political scene.
80
Article 24C(3) of the Indonesian Constitution provides that the Constitutional Court shall be 
composed of nine justices, in which three shall be nominated by the President, three nominated by the 
House of Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat or DPR), and three nominated by the Supreme Court.
Undang Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia [Constitution] art. 24C(3).
81
Government Names Seven Candidates for New Court, JAKARTA POST, Aug. 13, 2003.
82
Law of the Republic of Indonesia, No. 24 of 2003 on the Constitutional Court, arts. 24(1), 24(2).
83
Id. art. 50.
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The second obstacle for the Court was the lack of governmental 
support.  When the Court opened on August 19, 2003, it had no funding, no 
office, and no support staff. Chief Justice Jimly Asshidiqie frequently stated 
that he started the Court with only three pieces of paper: the Constitution, 
the Constitutional Court Law, and the Presidential Decree that appointed the 
Constitutional Court Justices.
84
With no office or infrastructure, the Court 
had to use the Chief Justice’s mobile phone as its first contact number.
85
It 
was not until January 2004 that the government let the Court use a building 
that originally belonged to the Ministry of Communication and Information 
as a temporary headquarters. The lack of sufficient governmental support 
left the responsibility of building the Court squarely in the Chief Justice’s 
hands.
Having reviewed the obstacles that the Court faced in its infancy 
period, the following section of this article will address the following 
questions: How did Chief Justice Asshiddiqie lead the Court to overcome 
this obvious lack of support as well as the many obstacles that beset the 
Court in the early days of its operation?  How did he build the Court into an 
institution with the capacity to stand up against the other branches of 
government? 
1. Setting a Doctrinal Foundation for Judicial Review 
Chief Justice Asshiddiqie’s first strategy was to remove any statutory 
rule that prevented the Court from exercising its authority.  This strategy was 
primarily aimed at removing Article 50 of the Constitutional Court Law, 
which stated that the Court could only review statutes that were enacted after 
October 19, 1999.  As a constitutional law scholar, Asshiddiqie fully 
understood that if the Court could not review longstanding statutes, the 
whole existence of the Court would be meaningless.  During his nomination 
hearing in front of the House Judiciary Committee, he made it clear that 
84
Jimly Asshiddiqie, Creating A Constitutional Court for a New Democracy, Lecture at Melbourne 
Law School (Mar. 11, 2009).  See also Jimly Asshiddiqie, Bermodal tiga lembar kertas [With Three Pieces 
of Paper], REPUBLIKA, Jan. 11, 2004.
85
Jimly Asshidiqie, Setahun Mahkamah Konstitusi: Refleksi, Gagasan Dan Penyelenggaraan, Serta 
Setangkup Harapan [The First Year of the Constitutional Court: Reflection, Idea, Action and Hope], in
MENJAGA DENYUT KONSTITUSI: REFLEKSI SATU TAHUN MAHKAMAH KONSTITUSI [KEEPING THE 
CONSTITUTION ALIVE: REFLECTION ON THE FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT] 3, 14 
(Refly Harun et al. eds., 2004).
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sooner or later the Court would nullify Article 50 because it was contrary to 
the Constitution.
86
Indeed, it did not take very long for the Court to decide the 
constitutionality of Article 50.
87
The opportunity for the Court to review 
Article 50 came when it considered the Chamber of Commerce Law Case in 
2005.
88
The claimants were members of the Medium and Small Scale 
Chambers of Commerce who challenged the constitutionality of the 
Chamber of Commerce Law of 1987.  Furthermore, the claimants also asked 
the Court to review Article 50.  The Court moved swiftly in declaring 
Article 50 unconstitutional and invalidated it entirely.
89
Chief Justice Asshiddiqie stated that it required great courage for the 
newly established Court to invalidate Article 50.
90
  He explained the Court’s 
decision as ijtihad, a term in Islamic law that describes the process of 
making a decision by personal effort, independently of any school of thought 
of Islamic jurisprudence.
91
  Moreover, Asshiddiqie said that he drew 
inspiration from John Marshall, a former Chief Justice of the United States 
Supreme Court and architect of the historic decision Marbury v. Madison.
92
It was in Marbury that the U.S. Supreme Court claimed for itself the power 
to judge the constitutionality of statutes.  “If John Marshall had courage to 
set a cornerstone for judicial review in the American legal history, I can also 
do the same thing for my country,” said Asshiddiqie.
93
86
Id. at 13.
87
When the Court decided its first case, it immediately grappled with the jurisdictional limitation 
imposed by Article 50.  The claimant was a district court judge who challenged the constitutionality of the 
1985 Supreme Court Law.  The issue was whether the Court could review the law enacted in 1985.  
Nevertheless, the Court did not explicitly nullify Article 50, instead deciding “to set aside” 
(mengenyampingkan) Article 50.  Why did the Court not explicitly nullify it? One plausible answer is 
because the claimant did not formally request the Court to do so. The claimant challenged the 
constitutionality of the Supreme Court Law, but not the Constitutional Court Law. Decision, Reviewing 
Law No. 1 of 1987 on the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, No. 066/PUU-II/2004 (Constitutional 
Court, Apr. 12, 2005), http://www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id/public/content/persidangan/putusan/putusan_ 
sidang_eng_Putusan%20066_PUU-II_2004%20(UU%20MKRI).pdf.
88
See id.
89
Id. at 55.
90
JIMLY ASHIDDIQIE, MENEGAKKAN TIANG KONSTITUSI: MEMOAR LIMA TAHUN KEPEMIMPINAN:
JIMLY ASHIDDIQIE PROF. DR. J, S.H. DI KAHNAMAH KONSTITUSI (2003–2008) [MEMOIR OF FIVE YEARS OF 
LEADERSHIP] 165 (2008).  
91
Id.
92
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
93
Interview with Jimly Asshiddiqie, Chief Justice of the Indonesian Constitutional Court, in Jakarta, 
Indon. (July 31, 2006) (translated to English by author).
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2. The Court as a Forum to Review Social, Economic and Political 
Issues
Initially, the politicians created the Court with limited authority.  
Hence, they never imagined a Court that would review many statutory 
regulations, touching on social and economic issues, and implicating the 
protection of fundamental rights.  The driving force behind this surprising 
result was, indeed, Chief Justice Asshiddiqie. 
Asshiddiqie believed that in a country experiencing economic and 
political transition like Indonesia, there should be a program for economic 
and political reform.  Moreover, he believed that the Court could contribute 
to the economic and political reform process,
94
particularly by reviewing 
governmental policies.
95
  Based on this belief, Asshiddiqie moved to expand 
the Court’s limited authority, thus endowing it with the tools to scrutinize 
political decisions made by the executive and legislative branches.
The Court’s decision in the Electricity Law Case is an example of 
how the Court reviewed economic policy.
96
The center of dispute in this 
case was the Electricity Law, which allowed the involvement of private 
enterprises in the electricity industry.
97
The Court ruled that electricity was 
an important sector for the country because it constituted a common good.
98
The Court further held that “it is only the state-owned enterprises that can 
manage the electricity industry.”
99
The Court decided to strike down the 
94
ROFIQUL-UMAM DKK., KONSTITUSI DAN KETATANEGARAAN INDONESIA KONTEMPORER:
PEMIKIRAN JIMLY ASSHIDDIQIE DAN PARA PAKAR HUKUM [CONSTITUTION AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN 
CONTEMPORARY INDONESIA: THE THOUGHTS OF JIMLY ASSHIDDIQIE AND OTHERS] 39 (Rofiqul-Umam 
Ahmad et al., eds. 2007).
95
See Oral Argument, Reviewing Law No. 30 of 2002 on the Anti-Corruption Commission Law, 
Nos. 012/PUU-IV/2006, 016/PUU-IV/2006, 019/PUU-IV/2006 (Constitutional Court, Nov. 21, 2006), 
http://www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id/public/content/persidangan/putusan/putusan_sidang_eng_PUTUSN
%20%20KPK%20%20%20(012-016-019)%20-%20Eng.pdf.
96
Decision, Reviewing Law No. 20 of 2000 on Electrical Power, No. 001-021-022/PUU-I/2003 
(Constitutional Court, Dec. 15, 2004) [hereinafter the Electricity Law Case]. An English translation of the
case is available at http://www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id/public/content/persidangan/putusan/putusan_
sidang_eng_Putusan%20001-021-022_PUU-I_2003%20(UU%20Ketenagalistrikan)%20
%20English.doc.pdf
97
See Law of the Republic of Indonesia, No. 20 of 2002 on Electrical Power. 
98
Electricity Law Case, supra note 96, at 345.  The Court used the term “hajat hidup orang banyak,” 
which I translated loosely to the common good.
99
Id. at 348.
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entire statute because the involvement of private enterprises in electricity 
industry was contrary to the economic clause of the Constitution.
100
The Court continued to deal with the privatization policies in the Oil 
and Gas Law I Case.
101
In this case, four human rights-based NGOs, a labor 
union, and an academic challenged the constitutionality of the Law no. 22 of 
2001 on Oil and Gas.  The Court held that the Law did not relinquish state 
control over oil and gas because all aspects of “controlled by the state,” 
which include regulation, administration, management, supervision, remain 
in the hands of government.
102
  Nevertheless, the Court agreed with the 
claimant that private business entities shall not be authorized to conduct 
exploitation and exploration activities because it will deprive the state 
control over oil and gas industry.
103
Apart from the issue of the state control, the Court also had to address 
the fuel prices regulation and the production quota regulation, which 
mandated the private business entity to provide a maximum of twenty-five 
percent of its share of Crude Oil and/or natural Gas production to fulfill the 
domestic demands.
104
The Court held that the twenty-five percent maximum 
production quota was contrary to Article 33(3) because the principle of 
common good requires sufficient fuel stocks for domestic consumption.  The 
Court held that the provision potentially could be abused by private business 
entities by providing a minimum amount of their oil and gas products, which 
eventually would threaten the domestic oil supply.   Finally, the Court had to 
deal with the issue whether market mechanisms could properly govern fuel 
prices.  It held that fuel prices should be regulated by the Government rather 
than by the market mechanism.
105
100
Article 33(2) of the Indonesian Constitution states that “[s]ectors of production which are 
important for the country and affect the life of the people shall be under the powers of the State.”  Undang 
Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia [Constitution] art. 33(2).
101
See Decision, Reviewing Law No. 22 of 2001 on Oil and Natural Gas, No. 002/PUU-I/2003
(Constitutional Court, Dec. 21, 2004) [hereinafter Oil and Natural Gas Law I Case]. The case is available
in English at http://www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id/public/content/persidangan/putusan/putusan_sidang
_eng_PUTUSAN%20PUU%20%20002-I-2003% 20(UU%20Migas)%20-%20English.pdf.
102
Id. at 220.
103
Id. at 222
104
Law of the Republic of Indonesia, No. 22 of 2001 on Oil and Gas, art. 22(1).
105
Oil and Natural Gas Law I Case, supra note 101, at 227.
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In the Water Resources Law I Case,
106
the Court, however, refused to 
invalidate the Water Resources Law that accorded private corporations 
control over Indonesia’s water resources.
107
Nevertheless, in its dicta the 
Court stated that the government has a duty to fulfill citizen access to clean 
water in several ways.
108
The Court stated further that “if the Law was 
interpreted different that the Court’s guideline, then it can be reviewed 
further (conditionally constitutional).”
109
In other words, the Court viewed 
that the Law is constitutional as long as the Government implements the 
Law according to the Court’s interpretation, but if the Government 
implements the law in different way, the claimant may challenge the statute 
for further review.
110
Another important policy area for the Court was the protection of civil 
and political rights, as many citizens expected the Court to correct past 
human rights abuses.  Indeed, in its first few years, the Court aggressively 
pushed the government to recognize the protection of fundamental liberties 
and correct its past errors.  The first high profile civil and political rights 
case was the Communist Party Case in 2003.
111
The claimants were thirty-
five political activists who filed a petition challenging the constitutionality 
of the General Election Law.
112
The Law banned a former member of the 
Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia - PKI) and its 
affiliate organizations from becoming a legislator in the national and local 
parliaments.
113
The ban existed since the late 1960s, after the government 
106
Decision, Reviewing the Law No. 7 of 2004 on Water Resources, No. 058-059-060-063/PUU-
II/2004 (Constitutional Court, July 19, 2005), http://www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id/public/content/ 
persidangan/putusan/putusan_sidang_eng_Putusan%20058-059-063%20PUU-II-2004.%20008-PUU-III-
2005%20(UU%20SDA).pdf [hereinafter Water Resources Law Case].
107
Undang–Undang No. 7 Tahun 2004 tentang Sumber Daya Air [Law of the Republic of Indonesia, 
No. 7 of 2004 on Water Resources].
108
Water Resources Law Case, supra note 106, at 492.  The Court held that the state has 1) a duty as 
regulator to issue license for water usage; 2) a duty to provide daily supply and irrigation for community 
farming (pertanian rakyat); 3) regional owned water companies should be positioned as the state’s 
operational unit and not as profit oriented company; and finally, 4) a duty to provide clean water is 
basically in the hand of central government and regional government, any involvement of private 
enterprises and cooperative are limited within the context that the government has not been able to provide 
clean water itself.
109
Id. at 495 
110
Id.
111
Decision, Reviewing the Law No. 12 of 2003 on the Election of National and Regional 
Parliament, No. 011-017/PUU-I/2003 (Constitutional Court, Feb. 24, 2004), 
http://www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id/public/content/persidangan/putusan/Putusan0172003tgl240204.pdf 
[hereinafter Communist Party Case].
112
See Law of the Republic of Indonesia, No. 12 of 2003 on General Election. 
113
Id. art. 60(g).
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accused the Indonesian Communist Party of kidnapping and killing six 
Army generals.
114
The Constitutional Court struck down the provision in the 
General Election Law, and held “individual members of the Communist 
Party and its affiliates should be treated equally as citizens without 
discrimination.”
115
The Court continued to pressure the government to respect 
fundamental liberties in the Lese Majesty Case.
116
Eggi Sudjana and 
Pandapotan Lubis were two veteran activists who were facing charges for 
insulting President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.  Both of them filed a 
petition asking the Court to nullify the lese majesty articles in the Criminal 
Code that formed the basis of their criminal charges.
117
The lese majesty is 
an offense against the dignity of a reigning sovereignty or against a state. 
The prohibition dated from the colonial period, but had been used by 
subsequent governments to jail political opponents and regime critics.
118
The Court accepted the petition and declared that the lese majesty articles 
were unconstitutional. The Court held that “lese majesty articles were 
irrelevant in a democratic state like Indonesia because they could negate the 
principle of equality before the law, and moreover it could harm the freedom 
of expression, freedom of information, and the principle of legal 
uncertainty.”
119
In the Spreading Hatred Case,
120
the Court unanimously invalidated 
the “spreading hatred” articles.
121
The claimant, Panji Utomo, is an activist 
based in Aceh, who was convicted by a district court for violating the 
“spreading hatred” articles.  Utomo was found guilty of criticizing the work 
of the Aceh and Nias Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Agency.  The Court 
114
For details on the impact of anti-communist witch-hunts, see ARIEL HERYANTO, STATE 
TERRORISM AND POLITICAL IDENTITY IN INDONESIA: FATALLY BELONGING (2006).
115
See Communist Party Case, supra note 111, at 36–37.
116
Decision, Reviewing the Indonesian Criminal Code, No 013-022/PUU-IV/2006 (Constitutional 
Court, Dec. 21, 2004) [hereinafter Lese Majeste Case].
117
Undang-Undang Hukum Pidana, arts. 134, 136–37 [Criminal Code].
118
See JOSEPH SAUNDERS, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN INDONESIA:
DISMANTLING SOEHARTO-ERA BARRIERS 53–61 (1998), https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports98/indonesia2/ 
Borneote-07.htm.
119
Lese Majeste Case, supra note 116, at 61.
120
Decision, Reviewing Articles 154 and 155 of the Criminal Code, No. 6/PUU-V/2007
(Constitutional Court, July 17, 2007) [hereinafter Spreading Hatred Case].
121
The “spreading hatred” articles (Articles 154–57 of the Criminal Code) involve “public expression 
of hate or insult to the government.”  Undang-Undang Hukum Pidana, arts. 154–57 [Criminal Code].  The 
articles are different than the “lese majeste” articles (Articles 134–37 of the Criminal Code), which 
criminalize insults directed at the president or the vice president.  Undang-Undang Hukum Pidana, arts. 
134–37 [Criminal Code].
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ruled that the potential for the abuse of power through these articles is 
flagrant because the provisions could be subjectively interpreted based on 
the government’s interests.
122
Prosecutors were not even required to prove 
whether the statement or opinion had resulted in the spread of hatred or 
hostility in general public.  The Court ruled further that these articles were 
irrational because a good abiding citizen would not hate his country or his 
government, unless he plots a rebellion or coup d’état.
123
The Court finally 
decided that these provisions were unconstitutional because they violated 
constitutional rights to freedom of association and freedom of expression. 
By the time the Court finished its first five-year term in 2008, it had 
struck down many important acts of the legislature. The Chief Justice’s 
heroic leadership style played an important role in shaping the Court’s 
decisions.  He managed to apply his vision that the Court should solve the 
economic issues in transition and overcoming the legacy of Soeharto’s 
authoritarian regime. 
3. Standing Strategy that Enhanced the Court’s Authority 
One of the most important aspects of judicial review is the doctrine of 
standing.  Standing refers to the issue of who can bring a claim to the court, 
including whether an individual or a designated institution can bring a claim.  
Under the leadership of Jimly Asshiddiqie, the Court crafted a doctrine of 
standing that expanded access for people to bring cases before the Court.  
Moreover, Chief Justice Asshiddiqie used the standing doctrine as a strategy 
to strengthen the judicial authority of his Court.
The Indonesian Constitutional Court established generalized 
grievance standing, which allows a petitioner to assert an injury suffered by 
all or a large number of class or citizens.
124
Generalized grievance standing 
was one of Chief Justice Asshiddiqie’s strategies to enhance the Court’s 
122
Spreading Hatred Case, supra note 120, at 77–78, para. 3.18.6.
123
Id. at 78–79, para 3.18.7 
124
In the U.S. constitutional realm, the U.S. Supreme Court has adopted a principle preventing 
individuals from invoking generalized grievances standing.  Thus, citizens are not allowed to sue if their 
only injury is as a taxpayer or citizen concerned with having the government follow the Constitution.  See
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 91 (2011).  Unlike the U.S 
Supreme Court, the Indonesian Constitutional Court allows individuals to have standing as a taxpayer or 
citizen.
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authority.
125
On the one hand, Asshiddiqie knew that the Court would not 
be able to review economic and social policies if no one challenged those 
policies before the Court.  On the other hand, there were many NGOs whose 
agenda was to challenge governmental policies, but were unable to do so in 
the past.  Asshiddiqie thus saw the potential for collaboration between the 
Court and NGOs because they both shared a similar vision for political and 
economic reform.
126
Therefore, he led the Court to apply generalized 
grievance standing, which permits NGOs to challenge governmental policies 
with minimal barriers in terms of standing. 
The Court established this standing doctrine in the Electricity Law
case, discussed in the previous section of this article.
127
The claimants were 
human rights NGOs who argued that as non-profit organizations, they had 
standing to represent the public.
128
The Court held, “considering the 
claimants are electricity consumers, and taxpayers, they have rights to 
question every statute on economic policy that involved public welfare.”
129
Thus, the Court allowed individuals and organizations to file petitions for 
judicial review as consumers and taxpayers.
Later in the Oil & Gas Law I Case,
130
the Court reinforced the 
generalized grievance standing approach.  The claimants were four human 
rights NGOs, which argued that as non-profit organizations they had 
standing to represent the public in challenging the privatization of the state 
owned oil company, Pertamina.
131
The Court held that the objective of 
those NGOs was to fight for public interest advocacy, and therefore that the
petitioners had standing to raise constitutional issues.
132
In other words, the 
125
See St. Hendrianto, From Humble Beginnings to a Functioning Court: The Indonesian 
Constitutional Court, 2003–2008 (2008) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington) (on 
file with author).
126
Private Conversation with Jimly Asshiddiqie (Dec. 22, 2014). Interview with Jimly Asshiddiqie, 
supra note 93.
127
Decision, Reviewing Law No. 20 of 2000 on Electrical Power, No. 001-021-022/PUU-I/2003 
(Constitutional Court, Dec. 1, 2004), http://www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id/public/content/ 
persidangan/putusan/putusan_sidang_eng_Putusan%20001-021-022_PUU
I_2003%20(UU%20Ketenagalistrikan)%20-%20English.doc.pdf.
128
Id. at 13–14.
129
Id. at 8.
130
Decision, Reviewing Law No. 22 of 2001 on Oil and Natural Gas, No. 002/PUU-I/2003 
(Constitutional Court, Dec. 15, 2004), http://www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id/public/content/persidangan/ 
putusan/putusan_sidang_eng_PUTUSAN%20PUU%20%20002-I-2003%20(UU%20Migas)%20-
%20English.pdf.
131
Id. at 19.
132
Id. at 293–95.
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Court permitted public interest NGOs to come before the Court as defenders 
of the people at large.  
It appears that Chief Justice Asshiddiqie had total control over the 
Court.  The Chief Justice is indeed the spokesperson and public face of the 
Court.  Nevertheless, he is the first among equals, not a superior.  The power 
structure of the Constitutional Court is horizontal instead of vertical.  Each 
of the Court’s members has authority to weigh in on important decisions.  
Moreover, there is always room for voices of dissent in the Court.  Therefore 
the Chief Justice cannot easily twist the direction of the Court based on his 
own preference. 
In some cases, Chief Justice Asshiddiqie faced opposition from his 
associate justices.  On the issue of taxpayer standing, two justices filed 
dissenting opinions and argued against the application of the generalized 
grievance form of standing.
133
Chief Justice Asshiddiqie was fully aware 
that he did not have absolute control over the Court’s decisions, and 
therefore he needed to find a strategy to bridge the differences among the 
justices.  He decided to take on the role of the consensus builder.  For 
example, on the standing issue, he tried to build a consensus among his 
colleagues that the Court needed to apply a more lenient standing test in its 
early years of operation.  One of the associate justices confirmed that the 
Chief Justice managed to convince his brethren to apply a lenient standing 
test to allow more parties (and more issues) to come before the Court.
134
Furthermore, Chief Justice Asshiddiqie successfully convinced his 
brethren not to express their dissent publicly. On the surface, the justices 
were conscious of avoiding open opposition to each other.
135
This gave the 
impression that the Justices were usually in agreement and that there was 
consensus among them on key issues.  On the issue of standing, the minority 
agreed to set aside their differences and therefore there was no need for them 
to express their dissent publicly.  In some cases, the dissenter did not write a 
separate dissenting opinion and the Court only mentioned the summary of 
the dissenting opinion without even mentioning the names of the dissenting 
133
Decision, Reviewing Law No. 24 of 2002 on the Government Securities Law, No. 003/PUU-
I/2003 (Constitutional Court, Oct. 29, 2004).
134
Private Conversation with Maruarar Siahaan, Associate Justice of the Constitutional Court, in 
Jakarta, Indon. (July 4, 2006).
135
Simon Butt, Judicial Review in Indonesia: Between Civil Law and Accountability? A Study of 
Constitutional Court Decisions, 2003–2005, at 123 (Dec. 2006) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University 
of Melbourne) (on file with author).
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justices.  Chief Justice Asshiddiqie might not have had total control over his 
court, but as a consensus builder he was effective in managing dissenting 
voices and minimizing the public impression of dissension on the Court. 
Asshiddiqie’s standing strategy was, indeed, successful in building the 
Court as a functioning institution.  It enabled the Court to review various 
governmental policies and pushed the government to comply with the 
Constitution.  Without Chief Justice Asshiddiqie’s strategy on standing, the 
Court would not be able stand up against the other branches of government.   
C. The Extra-Judicial Role of the Chief Justice  
The most visible example of Chief Justice Asshiddiqie’s heroic 
leadership style was the initiative he took in employing strategies outside of 
the courtroom to build the Court as a respected national institution.  These 
strategies came out as responses to external challenges that might have 
otherwise undermined the Court’s authority. 
The first external challenge for the Court was the lack of awareness 
from general public about the very fact of the Court’s existence.  As a newly 
established institution, the Court struggled to find its place among the 
constitutional stakeholders in Indonesia.
136
In response to this challenge, 
Chief Justice Asshiddiqie launched campaigns to raise the profile of the 
Court.  He initiated a weekly program to discuss the Court’s decisions on 
national public television and radio.
137
He delivered many speeches about 
the Constitutional Court, and he met with various social and political 
groups.
138
Secondly, the Court had to deal with the failure of the academic 
community to generate constructive consideration of the Court’s decisions.  
There were no well-managed legal reviews that could serve as a forum for 
experts to discuss the Court’s decisions.  Under such circumstances, Chief 
Justice Asshiddiqie had to take initiative to explain the Court’s rulings 
136
One of the best illustrations of this lack of awareness was an incident in which a University 
declined to facilitate a public speaking engagement for a Constitutional Court justice.  The university 
administration assumed that the Constitutional Court fell under the Ministry of Justice, and therefore they 
preferred to invite the Minister of Justice to speak on campus instead of a lower ranking official.  See
Irmanputra Sidin, Sembilan Pintu Kebenaran Konstitusi [Nine Constitutional Gates], KOMPAS (Jan. 6, 
2004), http://www.unisosdem.org/article_detail.php?aid=3463&coid=3&caid=21&gid=3.
137
See CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, THREE YEARS OF THE INDONESIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, supra
note 74.
138
See CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA, 2006 ANNUAL REPORT (2007).
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through the media.
139
The Chief Justice’s strategy was unorthodox.  
Nevertheless, he had to take such action in order to minimize the confusion 
among the constitutional stakeholders. 
The Court’s third major external challenge came from the 
government.  The new democratic government in Indonesia was not always 
keen to implement the Court’s decisions, giving rise to the possibility that 
the government might simply ignore them.  For instance, it took almost a 
year for Chief Justice Asshiddiqie to persuade the government to implement 
the Court’s decision in the Independent Candidate Case.
140
In this case, the 
Court ordered the government to make a new law that would facilitate the 
ability of independent candidates to run in regional elections.  The 
Government, however, refused to create the legislation mandated by the 
Court.
141
Having realized that the decision was ignored by the government, 
Chief Justice Asshiddiqie decided to confront the President directly in a 
private meeting. The day after the meeting, Chief Justice Asshiddiqie held a 
press conference in which he assured public that the Court ruling on 
independent candidates would be implemented soon.
142
Finally, in April 
2008, nine months after the Court issued its decision, the government and 
the House of Representatives passed the law that set the rules for 
independent candidates.
143
  The Court in its early stages needed a leader like 
139
For example, the Chief Justice had to explain the Court’s decision in the Communist Party Case.
As explained in the previous section, the Court decided in the Communist Party Case that a former member 
of the Communist Party may run for a position in the legislature.  Decision, Reviewing the Law No. 12 of 
2003 on the Election of National and Regional Parliament, No. 011-017/PUU-I/2003 (Constitutional Court, 
Feb. 24, 2004), http://www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id/public/content/persidangan/putusan/Putusan017200 
3tgl240204.pdf.  The General Election Commission, however, did not know what to do with the Court’s 
decision.  By the time the Court announced its decision, the deadline for the submission of legislative 
candidates had passed, and therefore the former member of the Communist Party would not be able to run 
in the legislative election.  Chief Justice Asshidiqie made a press statement and announced that the decision 
would not have immediate effect; hence it could only be implemented for the 2009 General Elections.  See
Bekas PKI Boleh Memilih dan Dipilih [Former PKI May Cast a Vote and Be Elected], TEMPO INTERAKTIF
(Feb. 24, 2004), https://m.tempo.co/read/news/2004/02/24/05539980/mahkamah-konstitusi-bekas-pki-
boleh-memilih-dan-dipilih.
140
Decision, Reviewing the Law No. 32 of 2004 on the Regional Election, No. 05/PUU-V/2007 
(Constitutional Court, July 23, 2007).
141
Pemerintah Bersikeras Tak Keluarkan Perpu [The Government Insisted Not to Issue Government 
Regulation in Lieu of Law], HUKUMONLINE (Aug. 15, 2007), http://www.hukumonline.com/berita/baca/ 
hol17376/pemerintah-bersikeras-tak-keluarkan-perpu.
142
Independent candidates can run in 2008: Jimly, JAKARTA POST (Aug. 13, 2007), 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2007/08/13/independent-candidates-can-run-2008-jimly.html
143
Independents To Start Running in June, JAKARTA POST (April 3, 2008).
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Asshiddiqie who was persistent in reminding the government that they 
should comply with the Court’s ruling.
Chief Justice Ashiddiqie’s strategies outside the courtroom, however, 
could provoke counter attack from the government.  In the Oil and Gas Law 
I Case,
144
the Court invalidated the law the allowed the market to govern 
fuel prices.
145
The Court ruled that the government should determine the 
fuel prices, not the market.  In response, the Government issued a 
Presidential Regulation that set fuel prices based on market mechanisms.
146
Chief Justice Asshiddiqie wrote a letter to the President urging him to 
comply with the Court’s decision.
147
The President wrote back and 
explained that the government had done nothing illicit, since the Court 
already gave authority to the government to determine fuel prices.
148
Furthermore, the President warned the Court not to trespass on other 
governmental branches’ jurisdiction and authority.
149
In addition, the 
Parliamentary Speaker Agung Laksono also warned the Chief Justice not to 
meddle in politics by sending a letter to the President.
150
Having realized 
that the issue had become too sensitive, Chief Justice’s Ashiddiqie decided 
to accept the government’s explanation and closed the discussion. 
The fourth external challenge for the Court was to build its profile as a 
respected institution.  For many years the authoritarian government in 
Indonesia treated the judiciary as an extension of executive authority.  The 
judges were treated as civil servants and subjected to compulsory 
membership in the government-sponsored civil service union.
151
Consequently, the judiciary had never enjoyed a respected status over the 
course of Indonesian history.  Moreover, the Chief Justice of the Supreme 
144
Decision, Reviewing Law No. 22 of 2001 on Oil and Natural Gas, No. 002/PUU-I/2003 
(Constitutional Court, Dec. 15, 2004), http://www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id/public/content/persidangan/ 
putusan/putusan_sidang_eng_PUTUSAN%20PUU%20%20002-I-2003%20(UU%20Migas)%20-
%20English.pdf.
145
Id.
146
Presidential Decree No. 55 of 2005 on Domestic Fuel Prices (Sept. 30, 2005).
147
Letter from Chief Justice of the Indonesian Constitutional Court to the President of Republic of 
Indonesia (Oct. 6, 2005) (on file with the author).
148
Letter from the President of Republic of Indonesia to the Chief Justice of Constitutional Court, 
(Oct. 14, 2005) (on file with the author).
149
Id.
150
Agung Laksono, Jimly Diminta Tak Berpolitik [Jimly Was Warned Not to Meddle in Politics], 
KORAN TEMPO, Oct. 12, 2005.
151
See POMPE, supra note 54, at 128.
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Court had been considered a second-class officer in the government 
hierarchy.
152
Within this context, Asshiddiqie fought for the recognition that the 
judicial branch was on par with its executive counterpart.  For example, in 
his first months in office, Chief Justice Asshiddiqie complained that he did 
not receive facilities and benefits that reflected his status as a high-ranking 
official.
153
He went to the government, and demanded a house and car, 
because the other high-ranking officers in Indonesia received a house and a 
car.  After long delay, the government agreed to grant him proper benefits as 
the Chief Justice of Constitutional Court.  Later, when he was re-elected as 
Chief Justice in 2006, he took the oath by himself while President Susilo 
Bambang Yudhyono watched behind him.
154
This seemingly small gesture 
signified his efforts to place himself on an equal footing with the President. 
Furthermore, Chief Justice Asshiddiqie believed that the Court needed 
a great office building to symbolize the importance of the institution.  After 
using a temporary office for quite a while, he came up with a plan to build a 
new office.  He proposed a budget of RP 191 billion (around US 180 
million) for a sixteen-floor office building.  In the beginning, the Parliament 
opposed the plan; however, he vigorously lobbied the House Judiciary 
Committee and convinced them to approve the Court’s plan to build a 
permanent office building.
155
Finally the parliament approved the plan and 
by the time the Court finished its calendar year in 2007, it had a magnificent 
new facility with elaborate architecture.
156
The Chief Justice explained that 
the Greek style of the building represented the notion of democracy 
emerging from ancient Greece, and signified the Court’s role as the guardian 
of the Constitution in democratic Indonesia.
157
  The Chief Justice also 
decided not to build fences around the Court building, so that the people 
152
The most telling incident in Indonesian judicial history was when the Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court, Wirjono Projodikoro, joined President Soekarno on his 1959 state visit to the United States and was 
given the status of parliamentarian.  Projodikoro was seated with senators and congressmen, while the 
American Chief Justice Earl Warren sat with Soekarno and President Eisenhower.  Id. at 44.
153
Mahkamah Konstitusi Dapat Dana Talangan 10,6 Miliar [The Constitutional Court Received 10.6 
Billion Dollar Contingency Fund], KORAN TEMPO, Oct. 10, 2003.
154
Negara dalam Negara [State Within State], MEDIA INDONESIA, Sept. 25, 2006.
155
Komisi III Tolak Pembangunan Gedung Mewah MK [The Commission III Rejects the Proposal for 
the Constitutional Court Luxurious Office Building], MEDIA INDONESIA, Feb. 3, 2005.
156
MAHKAMAH KONSTITUSI [INDONESIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT], SEJARAH PEMBANGUNAN 
GEDUNG MAHKAMAH KONSTITUSI [THE HISTORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL COURT BUILDING] (2007).
157
Wajah Romawi di Mahkamah Konstitusi [Roman Style in the Constitutional Court], TEMPO 
MAGAZINE (July 2, 2007), http://majalah.tempointeraktif.com/id/arsip/2007/07/02/ART/mbm.20070702.A 
RT124326.id.html.
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could come freely to the Court.  Moreover, he designated a special spot in 
front of the building for the people to have an open assembly.  Again, 
Asshiddiqie wanted to signal that the Court was the forum for citizens to 
express their opinion.
Yet Ashiddiqie and his associate justices would only occupy the new 
office for a short period of time.  The justices of the Constitutional Court 
would finish their terms in August 2008, and nobody knew whether they 
would be reappointed for their second five-year term.  Three of them, Laica 
Marzuki, Achmad Roestandi, and Soedarsono were obligated to retire 
earlier, having reached the mandatory retirement age of 67.
158
Moreover, it 
was unclear whether Chief Justice Asshiddiqie himself would be reappointed 
for a second five-year term. 
D. The Fall of Chief Justice Asshiddiqie 
A skilled Chief Justice like Asshiddiqie might have been the proper 
figure to lead the Court in transition; nevertheless, he occupied a vulnerable 
position.  Like the rest of the associate justices, Chief Justice Asshiddiqie 
had a limited term—the judge can only serve two five- year terms—and 
therefore he had to please those who had the authority to reappoint him for a 
new term.
159
Moreover, the Law states that the Chief Justice serves a three-
year term, though he can be reelected for a new term.
160
  As the Chief 
Justice, Asshiddiqie had to face reelection every three years and 
consequently was forced to please his own associate justices in order to be 
reelected.  The discussion on this subject will give an insight on what the 
Chief Justices in a newly established Court might learn in building its 
judicial power. 
In March 2008, the House reappointed Jimly Ashiddiqie for his 
second five-year term (2008–2013) and he was quite confident that he would 
continue to lead the Court.  Asshiddiqie was elected Chief Justice for the 
first time in 2003 and was reelected in 2006, so presumably he would remain 
as Chief Justice until 2009.
161
Nevertheless, by the time the Court began its 
new calendar year in August 2008, six new associate justices joined the 
bench and they demanded the election of a new Chief Justice.  On August 
158
Law of the Republic of Indonesia, No. 24 of 2003 on the Constitutional Court, art. 23(1).
159
Id. art. 22.
160
Id. art. 4(3).
161
Jimly Asshiddiqie the Face of Controversial Constitutional Court, JAKARTA POST, Jan. 3, 2008.
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20, 2008, the Court held an election for Chief Justice and a new associate 
Justice. Mohammad Mahfud defeated Chief Justice Asshiddiqie by one vote 
in the election.
Chief Justice Asshiddiqie suspected that the Yudhyono administration 
orchestrated his removal due to the Court’s decision to review the allocation 
of educational budget in the state budget.
162
The Constitution requires the 
government allocate a minimum of twenty percent of the state budget to 
education.
163
The Court held that the 2008 State Budget was in violation of 
the Constitution because it allocated less than the mandated twenty percent 
of the budget to education.
164
The Court ruled that the President and the 
House were guilty of deliberate defiance of the Constitution and demanded 
the full allocation be met in the 2009 budget.  But the Court allowed the 
existing underfunded budget to stand until the 2009 budget cycle took effect, 
arguing a delay was necessary “to avoid governmental disaster”.
165
The 
Court decided the Education Budget III Case on August 13, 2008 and 
Asshiddiqie believes that the decision prompted the Yudhoyono 
administration to arrange for his removal during the election of Chief Justice 
on August 20, 2008.
166
The new Chief Justice Muhammad Mahfud himself 
admitted that the then Vice President Jusuf Kalla asked him to run against 
Chief Justice Asshiddiqie.
167
Although Mahfud never explained the 
motivation behind the Vice President’s encouragement, it is easy to suspect 
that the government wanted to replace Asshiddiqie because the government 
was annoyed with Asshiddiqie’s leadership style.  
One of the most plausible reasons for the Executive to support 
Mahfud was his view on the role of the Court.  While he was serving as a 
member of the House Judiciary Committee, Mahfud expressed his 
disagreement with Asshiddiqie’s approach to judicial review.  He accused 
Asshiddiqie of steering the Court in the wrong direction, and he urged the 
Court to exercise judicial restraint in order to get back on track.  He 
proposed a formula of “10 taboos” that could serve as a template for the
162
Private Conversation with Jimly Asshiddiqie, supra note 126.
163
Undang Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia [Constitution] art. 31(4).
164
Decision, Reviewing Law No. 16 of 2008 on the Amendment of Law No. 45 of 2007 on the 2008 
State Budget, No. 13/PUU-VI/2008 (Constitutional Court Aug. 13, 2008).  The decision was the third time 
since 2004 the Court has found the government and the House guilty of a constitutional violation in 
education spending.
165
Id. at 101.
166
Private Conversation with Jimly Asshiddiqie, supra note 126.
167
RITA TRIANA BUDIARTI, ON THE RECORD: MAHFUD BEHIND THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
DECISIONS 54 (2010) [hereinafter BUDIARTI, ON THE RECORD].
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Court’s self-restraint.
168
His first taboo was that the Court should not create 
any new rule or regulation in its decisions.  Second, the Court should not 
review any governmental policy.  Third, the Court should make its decisions 
solely based on the Constitution.  As the fourth taboo, he stated that the 
Court should not impinge upon the jurisdiction of legislative.  The fifth was 
that the Court should not make reference to any constitutional theories or 
case precedents from foreign countries.  As the sixth taboo, he posited that 
the Court should recuse itself when it has self-interest in certain cases such 
as the cases addressing Article 50 that involved the Court’s jurisdictional 
limitation.  Giving interviews in the news media or offering public 
comments formed the seventh taboo.  The eighth taboo was that the Court 
should not build close relationships with any groups or help them to bring 
cases before the Court.  Mahfud envisioned the ninth taboo as a general 
prohibition on the Justices engaging in any activism outside of the Court.  
Finally, he was convinced that the Justices should not criticize the 
Constitution.
169
With this vision of extreme judicial restraint, Mahfud was 
the ideal candidate to dismantle Jimly Asshiddiqie’s work as the Court’s first 
leader.  The government had grown irritated with Asshiddiqie, who led the 
Court in challenging many governmental policies.  In Mahfud, Asshiddiqie’s 
opponents believed they had found the right man to make the Court more 
subservient to the other branches of government.    
Mahfud was sworn in as the second Chief Justice of the Constitutional 
Court on August 21, 2008.  Initially, Asshiddiqie remained as an associate 
justice; however, on October 8, 2008, he submitted his resignation from the 
Constitutional Court. During a press interview, he explained that he quit due 
to “psychological” tensions that had jeopardized his relations with the other 
eight justices and all court officials.  Asshiddiqie said at a press conference, 
“I think this is the right time for me to leave, in the hope that it will help the 
Chief Justice, the other Justices and all the court officials conduct their 
duties with ease.”
170
Chief Justice Mahfud, however, denied Asshiddiqie’s 
claim about psychological tension within the Court.
171
  For this reason, there 
was doubt about the real reason behind the resignation of Jimly Asshiddiqie, 
but one thing was clear:  his decision to step down marked the end of an era, 
and the beginning of the Mahfud Court.
168
MOHAMMAD MAHFUD, KONSTITUSI DAN HUKUM DALAM KONTROVERSI ISU [CONSTITUTION AND 
LAW IN CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES] 281–84 (2009).
169
Id.
170
Jimly Quits MK for Personal Reasons, JAKARTA POST, Oct. 8, 2008.
171
BUDIARTI, ON THE RECORD, supra note 167, at 36–37.
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After his resignation from the Court, Asshiddiqie initially took a break 
from politics.  He came back to the stage of national politics in 2010 when 
President Yudhoyono appointed him as a member of the Presidential 
Advisory Board.  Having spent six months as one of the President’s Advisor, 
Asshiddqie tendered his resignation because he wanted to make a bid to be 
selected for the top post of Anti-Corruption Commission leader.  Despite the 
massive public support for Asshiddiqie as a potential Anti-Corruption 
Commission’s chief, he did not even made it through to the final selection 
test before the House Judiciary Committee.
172
Asshiddiqie’s resignation 
from the Court and failure to secure a position in the Anti-Corruption 
Commission marked his waning political influence. 
The fall of Chief Justice Asshiddiqie raised the critical issue of 
judicial independence in the Indonesian Constitutional Court, especially in 
regard to the term of the justices.  Term length is a key component of 
judicial independence; if the appointment term is longer the judges are likely
more independent in exercising their authority.
173
Mandatory term limits 
remain a weak point of the current structure of the Indonesian Constitutional 
Court.  Although the government does not have direct control over the 
election of the Chief Justice, they can support associate justices likely to oust 
the Chief Justice from his leadership role.  In sum, short mandatory term 
limits are a primary mechanism for the Indonesian government to control the 
agenda and reach of the Indonesian Constitutional Court.
V. REMAKING THE COURT: MOHAMMAD MAHFUD AND THE COURT HE
MADE
Before reviewing the performance of Mahfud Court, an overview of 
Mahfud’s personal background is helpful to explain his leadership style after 
he took the helm of Chief Justice. 
A. Mohammad Mahfud: A Man Who Served in the Three Branches of 
Government.
Mohammad Mahfud Mahmodin (commonly known as Mahfud MD) 
grew up in Madura, an Indonesian island off the northeastern coast of 
172
Jimly Vows to Keep Supporting KPK, JAKARTA POST, Aug. 30 2010; Arghea Desafti Hapsari, 
Jimly Plays Hard to Get with KPK, JAKARTA POST, June 14, 2010.
173
Ginsburg, Economic Analysis, supra note 5, at 65.
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Java.
174
  A majority of Madurese Muslims are proponents of santri tradition,
a more orthodox version of Islam, which was influenced by Sunni Islam, the 
largest denomination school of the religion.  Mahfud grew up in a family 
with santri tradition, and his early education took place in an Islamic 
boarding school (pesantren).
175
Mahfud attended Faculty of Law of Indonesian Islamic University in 
Yogyakarta, where he was actively involved in the Indonesian Islamic 
Students Association (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam).
176
Upon his 
graduation, Mahfud became a professor of constitutional law at his alma 
mater. Later, he obtained his doctoral degree in constitutional law from 
Gadjah Mada University, the oldest public University in the country. 
Mahfud rose to national prominence when the late President Abdurrahman 
Wahid appointed him Minister of Defense in 2000.  There was some 
speculation that the appointment was solely based on Mahfud’s affiliation 
with the Nahdatul Ulama (NU), the largest traditional Islamic organization 
in Indonesia, which was once led by President Wahid.  For many Madurese 
like Mahfud, being a Muslim means “being a sympathiser of the NU[,]” but 
“[t]his strong identification . . . does not automatically mean that they have 
to officially become a member of the organization.”
177
After Mahfud served for nearly a year as the Minister of Defense, 
President Wahid appointed him to be the Minister of Justice.  He did not 
hold that position for a long time, however, because the People’s 
Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat) impeached 
President Wahid in 2001.  After Wahid’s impeachment and removal from 
office, Mahfud became active in the National Awakening Party (Partai 
Kebangkitan Bangsa or PKB), which was founded by President Wahid. 
From 2004 to 2008, Mahfud represented PKB in the House of 
Representatives and served as the member of the Judiciary Committee.  By 
the time Mahfud assumed the role of Chief Justice he was the only politician 
174
Mahfud rarely uses his complete name Muhammad Mahfud Mahmodin, and thus, in this article, I 
use Muhammad Mahfud instead.  Mahfud explains that the name of Mahmodin is basically his father’s 
name and his primary school teacher added the name to his original name in order to distinguish him with 
many other students who were also named Mahfud.  See AGUK IRAWAN MN, NOVEL BIOGRAFI MAHFUD 
MD: CAHAYAMU TAK BISA KUTAWAR [MAHFUD’S BIOGRAPHY: I CANNOT DENY YOUR LIGHT] 87–88 
(2014).
175
Id. at 34.
176
Id. at 220.
177
Yanwar Pribadi, Religious Networks in Madura: Pesantren, Nahdatul Ulama and Kiai as the Core 
of Santri Culture, 51 AL-JAMI‘AH: J. ISLAMIC STUD. 1, 14 (2013), http://www.aljamiah.or.id/index.php/ 
AJIS/article/view/151/54.
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in Indonesia who served in all three branches of government.  With his 
background and experience, Mahfud was a credible contender against a high 
profile Chief Justice like Jimly Asshiddiqie.  Mahfud’s social and political 
connections also advanced his ability to compete with someone like Jimly 
Asshiddiqie.  
B. The Mahfud Court:  Heavy on Promises, Mixed Record on Results
Chief Justice Mahfud came to the bench with a vision of strong 
judicial restraint and he did not present any sign of an unpredictable 
leadership style like his predecessor.  Reviewing the decisions of Mahfud 
Court is helpful to evaluate his leadership style and how faithful he was to 
his vows of judicial restraint. 
1. Less Favorable Treatment of Individual Rights 
One of the important focuses of Asshiddiqie’s Court was on the issue 
of civil and political rights. In many different cases, Asshiddiqie’s Court 
tried to push the government to recognize the protection of individual rights. 
It is helpful to draw comparisons between the decisions of the Asshiddiqie 
Court and Mahfud Court. 
The first major decision of Mahfud Court on the individual rights 
cases was the Pornographic Law Case.
178
The Pornography Law defines 
pornography as “pictures, sketches, illustrations, photographs, articles, 
sounds, voices, moving pictures, animations, cartoons, conversations, body 
movements or other forms of messages through various communication 
mediums and/or public displays that contain obscenity or sexual exploitation 
that violates community norms”.
179
Some NGOs sought to challenge the 
Law before the Constitutional Court.
180
  The Court rejected the claimant’s 
petition and held that although the Constitution guarantees some 
fundamental rights, there is a general limitation to those rights as stipulated 
in the Constitution by Article 28J(2).
181
The Court further held that “the 
178
Decision, Reviewing the Law No. 44 of 2008 on Pornography, No. 10-17-23/PUU-VII/2009 
(Constitutional Court, Mar. 25, 2010) [hereinafter the Pornography Law Case].  For background 
information on the litigation, see HOROWITZ, supra note 61, at 252–53.
179
Law of the Republic of Indonesia, No. 44 of 2008 on Pornography, art. 1 (1).
180
These NGOs include the Legal Aid Foundation, the Women’s Coalition for Justice and 
Democracy, and the Women’s Solidarity Union.
181
Pornography Law Case, supra note 178, at 381.  Article 28J (2) of the 1945 Constitution provides, 
“In exercising his/her rights and freedoms, every person shall have the duty to accept the restrictions 
established by law for the sole purposes of guaranteeing the recognition and respect of the rights and 
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limitation upon individual rights, including freedom of expression is not 
contrary to the Constitution, as long as such limitation is based upon 
recognition of other people’s rights and freedoms plus consideration of 
morality, and public order in a democratic society.”
182
Finally, the Court 
held the Law took into account Indonesian community values of propriety 
(nilai–nilai kesusilaan).
183
Nevertheless, the Court did not clarify the 
meaning of community values of propriety and it did not define the “right of 
others” that is believed should prevail over the freedom of expression.
184
The bottom line is that the Court recognized the authority of the government 
to curtail individual rights, an approach that stood in marked contrast from 
the approach of the previous Court that aggressively pushed the government 
to respect fundamental liberties.
Soon after the Pornography Law Case, the Court also upheld the 
constitutionality of the Blasphemy Law.
185
The Blasphemy Law dates from 
the era of Guided Democracy (1959–1965) when Soekarno, the first 
Indonesian President, tried to mobilize nationalist, religious, and communist 
forces to buttress his political power.
186
  The Law recognized that the 
majority of the Indonesian people adhere to six major religionsIslam, 
Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianismand 
it mandated that the Government protect these religions.
187
The Law also 
created several protection mechanisms to achieve this aim.  First, it was 
unlawful to communicate, propagate, or to solicit public support for an 
interpretation of a religion that deviates from the teaching of that religion.
188
Second, it set criminal penalties for intentionally criticizing or attempting to 
freedoms of others and of satisfying just demands based upon considerations of morality, religious values, 
security and public order in a democratic society.” Undang-Undang Dasar Republik Indonesia 
[Constitution] 1945, art. 28J(2).
182
Pornography Law Case, supra note 180, at 387.
183
Id.
184
BUTT & LINDSEY, supra note 61, at 202.
185
Decision, Reviewing Presidential Decree No. 1 of 1965 on the Prevention of the Misuse/Insulting 
of Religion (Blasphemy Law), Law 5 of 1969, No. 140/PUU-VII/2009 (Constitutional Court, Apr. 19, 
2010) [hereinafter Blasphemy Law Case].  For a detailed analysis of the Court’s decision in the Blasphemy 
Law Case, see Melissa A. Crouch, Law and Religion in Indonesia: The Constitutional Court and the 
Blasphemy Law, 7 ASIAN J. COMP. L. 5 (2012). See also MELISSA CROUCH, LAW AND RELIGION IN 
INDONESIA: CONFLICT AND THE COURTS IN WEST JAVA (2014) [hereinafter CROUCH, CONFLICT AND THE 
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undermine the six major religions, including a maximum penalty of five 
years’ imprisonment.
189
The Law, however, recognized other religions such 
as Judaism, Shinto, Taoism, and others as legitimate so long as they 
complied with the prohibition under the Blasphemy Law and other statutory 
regulations.
190
Some NGOs and political activists requested that the Mahfud Court 
declare the Blasphemy Law unconstitutional because it ran contrary to the 
religious liberty clause
191
and freedom of expression clause of the 
Constitution.
192
The Court rejected the petition and took a similar approach 
to that adopted in the Pornographic Law Case.  The Court held that the 
Blasphemy Law is the manifestation of Article 28J(2), and therefore the 
state has the authority to limit liberty as long as it based upon recognition of 
other people’s rights and freedoms.
193
This restriction pertains to morality, 
religion, and public order in a democratic society.
194
The Court held that the 
Blasphemy Law was never intended to curtail religious freedom, but rather 
was aimed to protect religion.
195
On the issue of freedom of expression, the 
Court viewed that the claimants had misinterpreted the scope and meaning 
of freedom of expression as unlimited rights.
196
The Court held that freedom 
of expression can be limited and even be sanctioned.
197
Clearly, the 
Blasphemy Law Case reaffirmed the Court’s stand on the general limitations 
of rights by Article 28J(2), which also include limitations on free speech.  
With this ruling, the Court supported the idea that religious “deviancy” leads 
to social disorder, which was argued by many Islamic leaders and the 
government during oral argument.
198
After the Court announced its decision, the claimants went to the 
House of Representative and urged the legislators to examine the Court’s 
189
Id. art. 4.
190
Id. art 1.
191
Undang-Undang Dasar Republik Indonesia [Constitution] 1945, arts. 28E(1), 29.
192
Id. arts. 28E(2), 28E(3)
193
Decision, Reviewing Presidential Decree No. 1 of 1965 on the Prevention of the Misuse/Insulting 
of Religion (Blasphemy Law), Law 5 of 1969, No. 140/PUU-VII/2009 (Constitutional Court, Apr. 19, 
2010) (Blasphemy Law Case).
194
Id. at 293.
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Id. at 294.
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decision in the Blasphemy Law Case.
199
The claimants alleged that the 
Court had manipulated the affidavit from the National Human Rights 
Commission, which stated the Law was necessary to preserve public 
order.
200
The claimants presented some evidence that the National Human 
Rights Commission suggested otherwise. Chief Justice Mahfud responded 
by accusing the NGOs who filed the complaint of merely seeking attention 
and he questioned their credibility as human rights advocates.
201
Despite the Mahfud Court’s tendency to defer to lawmakers, in some 
instances, the Court tried to protect constitutional rights of citizens.  In the 
Book Banning Case, the Court decided to nullify the law which allowed the 
Attorney-General's Office (AGO) to ban books.
202
  The case originated from 
the 1963 Law on Securing Printed Materials that allowed the AGO to ban 
distribution and confiscate books whose content could disrupt the public 
order.  In 2009, the AGO banned five books, which included the book 
Pretext for Mass Murder: The September 30th Movement and Suharto’s 
Coup d’Etat in Indonesia by John Roosa of the University of British 
Colombia.
203
The Court, however, did not make any explicit ruling on the 
freedom of speech.  Instead, the Court appeared to consider the books as 
“property.”  The Court ruled the authority of the Attorney General to ban 
and seize the books and printed materials without any judicial proceedings
could be considered an extra-judicial execution that violated individuals’ 
rights to own property.
204
Some of the Mahfud Court decisions in the area of civil and political 
rights signified an important departure from the Court’s earlier approach. 
The Asshiddiqie Court believed that it was the duty of the Court to correct 
governmental infringement upon constitutional rights and therefore the court 
199
MK Dituding Manipulasi Fakta Persidangan UU Penodaan Agama [The Constitutional Court 
Was Accused of Manipulating the Facts of the Blasphemy Law Case), HUKUMONLINE (Apr. 23, 2010), 
http://www.hukumonline.com/berita/baca/lt4bd14fbb6604f/mk-dituding-manipulasi-fakta-persidangan.
200
Decision, Reviewing Presidential Decree No. 1 of 1965 on the Prevention of the Misuse/Insulting 
of Religion (Blasphemy Law), Law 5 of 1969, No. 140/PUU-VII/2009, at 182–83, 283 (Constitutional 
Court, Apr. 19, 2010) (the claimants asserted that the National Human Rights Commission never held a 
position that the Law was necessary, but rather, that it was unconstitutional).
201
Itu Genit yang Kebablasan [When Flirting Becomes Too Much], KOMPAS (Apr. 22, 2010), 
http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2010/04/22/22444396/mahfud.md.itu.genit.yang.kebablasan.
202
Decision, Reviewing Law No. 16 of 2004 on the Power of the Attorney General to Ban Books and 
Law No. 4/PNPS/1963 on the Seizure of Printed Materials that Cause Public Disturbance, No. 6-13-
20/PUU-VIII/2010 (Constitutional Court, Oct. 13, 2010) [hereinafter the Book Banning Case].
203
Camelia Pasandaran, Court Hears Author’s Legal Case Against Book Bans, JAKARTA GLOBE
(Mar. 9, 2010), http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/archive/court-hears-authors-legal-case-against-book-bans/.
204
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should protect such rights.  On the contrary, the Mahfud Court seemed to 
defer to the government in the arena of civil and political rights, but some of 
the Court decisions were often inconsistent with Chief Justice Mahfud’s own 
rhetoric.
205
In many instances, Chief Justice Mahfud defended a progressive 
point of view and a flexible constitutional interpretation, but the Court 
decisions in the Pornography Law Case and the Blasphemy Law Case were 
far from a progressive and flexible interpretation.
206
2. More Favorable Treatment to Administrative Law Cases 
Although Mahfud came to the Court vowing judicial restraint, he did 
not remain faithful to that vow.  He broke it in instances when the Court has 
reviewed administrative policies and produced a set of new rules.  Take, for 
example, the Court’s decision in the ID Card Case.
207
The case arose from 
poor election management that caused around forty-seven million voters to 
be unregistered in legislative elections.
208
Refli Harun was a political 
activist who was not registered as a voter.  He filed a petition to the Court 
and challenged the Election Law.  The Court held that all Indonesian citizens 
who were not registered on the final electoral roll could show their IDs in 
order to cast a vote and for those who are living overseas can use their 
passports to cast a vote.
209
The Court held further that voters using an ID 
card must also show their family card (Kartu Keluarga) and may only cast 
their ballot in their residential neighborhood.
210
Chief Justice Mahfud broke his own enumerated taboos because the 
Court created a new rule about voting registration in this decision.  Mahfud, 
however, argued that he had to make such decision in response to the critical 
situation in national politics.
211
Chief Justice Mahfud made a reference to 
presidential candidates Jusuf Kalla and Megawati Soekarnoputri who 
threatened to withdraw from the presidential race if the General Elections 
205
HOROWITZ, supra note 61, at 254.
206
Id. at 253–54.
207
Decision, Reviewing the Law No. 42 of 2008 on the Presidential Election, No. 102/PUU-VII/2009 
(Constitutional Court, July 6, 2009), http://www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id/public/content/persidangan/
putusan/putusan_sidang_eng_verdict%20no%20102_PUU_VII_2009.pdf [hereinafter the ID Card Case].
208
Bring KPU Members to Court, Analysts Say, JAKARTA POST (July 7, 2009), 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2009/07/07/bring-kpu-members-court-analysts-say.html.
209
ID Card Case, supra note 207, at 19–20.
210
Id. at 17.
211
Mahfud MD: Putusan Itu Hanya Butuh Sepuluh Menit [Mahfud MD: It Took Only Ten Minutes to 
Reach the Decision], TEMPO MAGAZINE (July 13, 2009), https://majalah.tempo.co/konten/2009/07/13/ 
WAW/130833/Mahfud-MdPutusan-Itu-Hanya-Butuh-Sepuluh-Menit/21/38.
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Commission (Komisi Pemilihan Umum or KPU) did not allow unregistered 
voters to use their ID cards to cast a ballot.  Mahfud argued that the 
withdrawal of Megawati and Jusuf Kalla from the presidential race would 
threaten the legitimacy of democracy in Indonesia, and therefore the Court 
should intervene and save the democratic process.
212
Chief Justice Mahfud continued to break his taboos in the Attorney 
General Case.
213
The case originated from the political conflict between the
Yudhoyono administration and a veteran politician, Yusril Ihza Mahendra.  
Mahendra served in the First Yudhoyono administration as the State 
Secretary; however, in May 2007, President Yudhoyono dismissed 
Mahendra due to his alleged involvement in several high-profile graft cases.  
On June 24, 2010, the Attorney General’s Office named and charged 
Mahendra under the Anti-Corruption Law for his approval of the Ministry of 
Justice’s online corporate registration system (Sistem Administrasi Badan 
Hukum—Sisminbakum).  Mahendra fought back by filing a petition to the 
Constitutional Court, in which he challenged the appointment of the then 
Attorney General Hendarman Supandji.  Mahendra argued that Supandji was 
an illegitimate Attorney General because he had never been formally re-
appointed as the Attorney General after he finished his first term in office.
214
Mahendra argued that as an illegitimate Attorney General, Supandji had no 
authority to take legal actions against him.  The President’s legal team 
argued that formal re-appointment for the Attorney General was unnecessary 
because the Law prescribed that the Attorney General would remain in the 
office until he was dismissed from his post.
215
The Court majority ruled that the Attorney General Law created legal 
uncertainty because it did not provide any clarity on when the Attorney 
General shall begin and end his term in office.
216
  Nevertheless, the Court 
held that the law is “conditionally constitutional,” as it should be interpreted 
to mean that the Attorney General should serve a five year term like the 
President and others cabinet ministers, and can be removed by the President 
at any time.
217
Here, the Court tried to frame its decision with different 
212
Situasi Agak Gawat [It Was a Critical Moment], KOMPAS, July 7, 2009.
213
Reviewing Law No. 16 of 2004 on the Attorney General Office, No. 49/PUU-VIII/2010 
(Constitutional Court Oct. 16, 2010) [hereinafter the Attorney General Case].  
214
Yusril Files Report Against Attorney General, JAKARTA POST (July 1, 2010),
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2010/07/01/yusril-files-report-against-attorney-general.html.
215
Attorney General Case, supra note 215, at 64–66.
216
Id. at 132–33, para 3.31.
217
Id. at 133, para 3.32.
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language, which can be confusing.  Instead of declaring the Attorney
General Law unconstitutional, it declared that the law is “conditionally
constitutional.” 
In response to the Court’s decision, Denny Indrayana, the President’s 
legal adviser, argued that Supandji was still a legitimate Attorney General 
because the Court did not explicitly rule that his appointment was 
unconstitutional.
218
Mahendra, however, believed that Supandji was no 
longer legally the Attorney General.
219
Chief Justice Mahfud decided to 
intervene by urging the President to dismiss the Attorney General 
Hendarman Supandji immediately.
220
President Yudhoyono decided to 
uphold the Court ruling by removing Hendarman Supandji from his post.  
Mahfud explained that he had to intervene to resolve the conflict of 
interpretation between Mahendra and the President’s legal adviser or 
otherwise there would be an endless conflict of interpretation.
221
The Mahfud Court continued to be defiant of governmental policies in 
the area of administrative law when the Court decided the Deputy Minster
Case.
222
The State Ministry Law allowed the President to appoint a deputy 
minister to assist some of the minister’s responsibilities.
223
In his second 
administration, President Yudhoyono appointed twenty Deputy Ministers.
224
An NGO named the National Movement to Eradicate Corruption (GNPK)
challenged the appointment of those deputy ministers and argued that the 
positions were unnecessary and a waste of state funds. 
The Court struck down the elucidation of article 10 of the State 
Ministry Law which defined deputy ministers as career bureaucrats. The 
218
Nivell Rayda, Camelia Pasandaran & Heru Andriyanto, Surprise Ruling Sees Attorney General 
Lose Job, JAKARTA GLOBE (Sept. 23, 2010), http://jakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/archive/surprise-ruling-sees-
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219
Id.
220
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Leave], HUKUMONLINE (Sept. 22, 2010), http://www.hukumonline.com/berita/baca/lt4c9a327ade2d2/ 
hendarman-supandji-harus-berhenti.
221
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222
Decision, Reviewing Law No. 30 of 2008 on State Ministry, No. 79/PUU-IX/2011 (Constitutional 
Court, June 5, 2012). The case is available in English at http://www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id/public/
content/persidangan/putusan/putusan_sidang_eng_Ikhtisar%20Putusan-putusan%20wamen%20(ENG).pdf
[hereinafter the Deputy Minister Case].
223
Law of the Republic of Indonesia, No. 30 of 2008 on State Ministry, art. 10.
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SBY Installs New Members of Cabinet, JAKARTA POST (Oct. 19, 2011), 
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Court held that deputy ministers are not members of the cabinet minister. 
The Court considered that elucidation of article 10 would cause legal 
complication because there is no clarity of the term length for a deputy 
minister’s position.
225
The Court expressed a concern that as a career 
bureaucrat, a deputy minister could stay in his position indefinitely even 
though the President and his cabinet ministers had finished their term in 
office.
226
Finally, the Court held that the President’s Yudhoyono’s 
appointment of deputy ministers based on Article 10 elucidation was
unconstitutional.
227
3. Preserving the Legacy of Standing Doctrines
One of Mahfud’s ten taboos provided that the Court should not review 
governmental policy.  Many of Chief Justice Mahfud’s decisions were 
clearly inconsistent with this taboo.  In some instances, he clearly broke his 
taboo by leading the Court to review some governmental policies.  
Moreover, Chief Justice Mahfud employed the same interpretation of 
standing as his predecessor, in which the Court applied general grievance 
standing in order to open the door to reviewing governmental policies. 
An apt example of the Mahfud Court’s reaffirmation of its 
predecessor’s strategy is the Court’s decision in the Oil and Gas III Case.
228
The claimants in this case were twelve Islamic based organizations and 
thirty individuals, chiefly led by Muhammadiyah, one of the largest Islamic 
organizations in the country.  The claimants challenged some of the key 
statutory provisions, which mandated the government establish a Regulatory 
Agency to supervise the oil and gas sector.
229
They argued that these 
statutory provisions would reduce the state control over natural resources 
and those resources then could not be used to the greatest benefit of the 
people as mandated by article 33 section 3 of the Constitution.
230
The claimants argued that the government policies to privatize oil and 
gas industries had infringed on their constitutional rights of development.
231
225
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226
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227
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228
Decision, Reviewing Law No. 22 of 2001 on the Oil and Gas Law, No. 36/PUU-X/2012 
(Constitutional Court, Nov. 13, 2012) [hereinafter the Oil and Gas III Case].
229
Law of the Republic of Indonesia, No. 22 of 2001 on Oil and Gas, arts 1(23), 4(3).  See also Oil 
and Gas III Case, supra note 228, at 24.
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231
Id. at 17–18.
   
 
                                           
537 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOL. 25 NO. 3
 
Moreover, Muhammadiyah as the chief petitioner also stated that they came 
before the Court as Islamic organizations that had the objective to establish 
Islamic civil society, and, thus, had standing to represent public interest.
232
The Court ruled that Muhammadiyah and others had standing to bring the 
case because their constitutional rights may potentially be injured by the 
application of the law.
233
In its ruling, the Court did not explicitly state that 
Muhammadiyah as a religious based NGO may enter the stage of 
constitutional litigation as a public defender.  Nonetheless, by granting 
standing to Muhammadiyah, the Mahfud Court continued to apply a loose 
standing doctrine.
234
The Court also allowed an NGO to challenge the authority of the 
Ministry of Forestry to grant large concessions to private mining companies 
for mining exploration in the Indigenous Forest Case.
235
The case was 
significant because Indonesia's central government had control over the 
country’s vast forest area and thus the Ministry of Forestry had rights to 
grant large concessions to private companies for logging, plantations, and 
mining exploration even if the area had been managed for generations by 
indigenous people.  The case was initiated by an NGO, Indigenous Peoples 
Alliance of the Archipelago (Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara or 
AMAN), which claimed that they represented indigenous people across the 
archipelago.
236
  The Court ruled that as an NGO who had concern over 
indigenous issues, the petitioner had standing to challenge the Forestry Law 
before the Court.
237
C. The Heroic Leadership Continued 
While Mahfud’s rhetoric emphasized judicial restraint, in many cases, 
the Mahfud Court demonstrated that it inherited many of the ambitions of 
232
Id. at 20–21. See also Undang Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia [Constitution] art. 
28C(2).
233
Oil and Gas III Case, supra note 228, at 179–80.
234
Id. at 214.  There is a dissenting opinion in which Justice Haryono argued that the plaintiffs have
no standing to bring the case.  Justice Haryono did not write a lengthy dissent and he simply criticized the 
Court majority for their lack of consideration with regard to the standing issue.  He believed that the Court 
did not provide sufficient legal reasoning in reaching a conclusion that the plaintiffs have standing to argue 
before the Court.
235
Decision, Reviewing Law No. 41 of 1999 on Forestry, No. 35/PUU-X/2012 (Constitutional Court, 
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237
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Chief Justice Asshiddiqie.  During his tenure as the Chief Justice, Mahfud 
took the same path as his predecessor to expand the Court’s authority.  One 
of the Asshiddiqie Court’s legacies preserved by the Mahfud Court was the 
Regional Election disputes.  While he was still in office, Chief Justice 
Asshiddiqie made a proposal to the House of Representatives to grant new 
authority for the Court to handle regional election disputes.
238
Initially, the 
Supreme Court had authority to handle regional election disputes, which 
included elections for Governor and Head of Regency (Bupati).
239
Nevertheless, one of the most visible problems facing the Supreme Court 
was the extensive backlogs that plagued the Court for several decades.
240
The jurisdiction over regional elections disputes did not help the Supreme 
Court in overcoming backlogs.  Chief Justice Asshiddiqie proposed to take 
over the regional election disputes in order to ease the burdens on the 
Supreme Court.  On April 28, 2008, the House (DPR) passed a new law that 
authorized the Constitutional Court to handle regional election disputes.
241
Chief Justice Asshiddiqie then graciously accepted the new authority and 
tried to show that the Constitutional Court was better prepared than the 
Supreme Court to handle election disputes.  
Chief Justice Asshiddiqie did not have to deal with the influx of the 
regional election disputes, as he resigned from the Court in October 2008.  It 
was Chief Justice Mahfud who led the Court to handle these disputes.  
Despite the flood of cases, the Mahfud Court continued to broaden the scope 
of the Court’s authority. Initially, the law prescribed that the object of 
adjudication could only concern the final result of the regional election.
242
The Mahfud Court, however, went further to review any infringement upon 
regional election processes, including both administrative and criminal 
infringement.
243
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Chief Justice Mahfud also followed the path of his predecessor by 
trying to resolve political crises.  The most obvious example was the 
Hamzah & Riyanto Case.
244
  The claimants in this case, Chandra Hamzah 
and Bibit Riyanto, were the Commissioners of the Anti-Corruption 
Commission.  The Commission managed to wiretap a high-ranking police 
official on the suspicion that the official was taking bribes.  The Indonesian 
National Police then moved to incriminate Hamzah and Riyanto, alleging 
that they abused their power.
245
As Hamazh and Riyanto’s trial loomed, 
there was significant public pressure on President Yudhoyono to save the 
Anti-Corruption Commission.  President Yudhoyono issued a Government 
Regulation in Lieu of Law (Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang—
Undang or PERPU) that gave himself power to appoint the Anti-Corruption 
Commissioner if three or more commissioner positions became vacant.
246
Prior to the enactment of this PERPU, the Law required the positions to be 
filled using a rigorous fit and proper test in the parliament.  Under the 
PERPU, the President had authority to appoint temporary commissioners to 
fill the vacant positions with commissioners who had the same rights, 
powers, and obligation as did commissioners serving full terms.
Many legal analysts criticized President Yudhoyono for issuing the 
PERPU and moreover, they blamed the Chief Justice for advising the 
President to pass the PERPU.  Chief Justice Mahfud admitted that he had 
advised President Yudhoyono to pass the PERPU.
247
But Mahfud stated that 
he had no hidden agenda other than to save the Anti-Corruption 
Commission.
248
Furthermore, Chief Justice Mahfud continued to advise the 
President on the selection process of temporary commissioners.  
In the meantime, Hamzah and Riyanto went to the Constitutional 
Court and challenged the law that could cause their removal from the 
Commission.  The Law stated, “The Anti-Corruption Commissioners are to 
PENYELESAIAN SENGKETA HASIL PEMILUKADA OLEH MAHKAMAH KONSTITUSI [STUDY ON THE 
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SETTLEMENT OF LOCAL ELECTION DISPUTE BY THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT]
(2012).
244
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245
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and the National Police, see SIMON BUTT, CORRUPTION AND LAW IN INDONESIA (2012).
246
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detained on suspicion of murdering a businessman.      
247
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leave their positions or to be removed from their positions if they become a 
defendant in a criminal case.”
249
Hamzah and Riyanto argued that the 
provision contravened their constitutional right to a presumption of 
innocence.
250
  Moreover, they argued that the Law is discriminatory because 
all other state officials had the benefit of the doubt until convicted, in which 
they could be suspended but not dismissed.
251
Hamzah and Riyanto asked the Court to issue an interim injunction to 
prevent their dismissal before the Court could hear their case.  Considering 
that the Court’s authority was limited to determining the constitutionality of 
a statue and issuing appropriate declaratory remedies as claimed, in theory 
the Court had no authority to issue an injunctive remedy to prevent the 
criminal investigation of Hamzah and Riyanto.  Surprisingly, the Court 
decided that it could issue an injunction.  But on the question of to whom the 
injunction would be directed, the Court admitted that it lacked jurisdiction to 
order police and prosecutors to postpone the criminal investigations against 
Hamzah and Riyanto.
252
Finally, the Court ordered the President to refrain 
from suspending Hamzah and Riyanto until a final verdict was issued.
253
Having realized that the Court lacked authority to stop the criminal 
proceeding, Chief Justice Mahfud criticized the police in the media and 
urged the police to bring the Commissioners alleged abuses of power to the 
State Administrative Court instead of the Criminal Court.
254
Furthermore, 
he stated that if he were the President, he would remove the Chief of 
National Police.
255
After the press conference, Chief Justice Mahfud met 
with the President Susilo Bambang Yudhyono privately and tried to 
convince the President to drop the case because the Police had no basis to 
incriminate the Commissioners of the Anti-Corruption Commission.
256
249
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Surprisingly, the former Chief Justice Jimly Asshiddiqie criticized 
Mahfud for his media interview and his effort to lobby the President.  
Asshiddiqie stated that it was inappropriate for Chief Justice Mahfud to 
criticize the Chief of National Police in the media.
257
Asshidiqie’s criticism 
was ironic because he essentially criticized his own strategy.  Consequently, 
it was easy for Mahfud to rebut Asshiddiqie, saying that he was just 
following in the footsteps of his predecessor, who was very active in the 
media and in lobbying the President.
258
Mahfud further argued that he had 
to speak to the media to appeal for public support because the Court lacked 
authority to stop the criminal investigation.
259
Chief Justice Mahfud continued to give media interviews in the 
Mohammad Sholeh Case.
260
Mohammad Sholeh was a legislative candidate 
from the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P).  He challenged 
the constitutionality of the Legislative Election Law, which ruled that the 
candidate with the highest-ranking position on the candidate list shall be 
elected as legislator.
261
The Court accepted his argument and declared the 
rules unconstitutional.  The General Election Commission, however, refused 
to comply with the Court’s decision.  Chief Justice Mahfud issued a press 
statement and warned the Election Commission that there would be political 
and criminal consequences for all commissioners who refused to comply 
with the Court’s decision.
262
He argued that the situation forced him to 
speak out to the media; otherwise the General Election Commission would 
have never followed the Court’s decision.
263
During his tenure as Chief Justice, Mahud gave many media 
interviews on politically sensitive issues and on the cases pending before the 
Constitutional Court.  In 2011, Chief Justice Mahfud was named 
Newsmaker of the Year by Seputar Indonesia, a news program broadcast by 
257
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private television station RCTI.
264
Chief Justice Mahfud’s extra-judicial 
strategies, which included frequent media interviews, indicated that the 
Court still needed the leadership of a heroic Chief Justice to deal with the 
pressure from the government and other political actors.  Without it, the 
government might have continued to ignore or disrespect the Court’s 
decisions.  Therefore, the Chief Justice must sometimes act outside of the 
courtroom, opening up confrontation with the government. 
D. The Corruption Scandals 
One of the biggest challenges for Mahfud during his tenure as the 
Chief Justice was his Court’s several alleged corruption scandals.  These 
scandals brought serious challenges to his legitimacy as the Chief Justice of 
the Constitutional Court.  One of the high profile scandals involved 
Associate Justice Mohammad Arsyad and centered on allegations that he 
manipulated the Court’s decision in a regional election dispute.  In 2009, the 
Court examined a dispute over the Head of Regency Election in South 
Bengkulu.  A candidate for the position, Nirwan Mahmud, bribed both 
Arsyad’s daughter and Arsyad’s brother-in-law to convince Justice Arsyad 
to sway the Court’s decision in Mahmud’s favor.  Justice Arsyad admitted 
that his daughter indeed met the candidate; however, he denied that his 
daughter had introduced the candidate to him.
265
Chief Justice Mahfud handled the scandal well.  He decided to 
establish an independent ethics council which examined Arsyad’s 
involvement in the affair.  The Ethics Council found evidence of a meeting 
between the candidate and Arsyad’s daughter and brother-in-law.  Moreover, 
the Council also found that Arsyad’s family members had held meetings 
with Arsyad’s law clerk afterward.  The Council concluded that Arsyad 
violated the judiciary code of ethics because he failed to stop his family 
members from making a deal with parties involved in cases being handled 
by the Court.  Arsyad maintained that he did not commit any crime; 
nevertheless, he tendered his resignation and left the Court in disgrace.
266
264
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A few months after Arsyad left office, a new scandal surfaced.  While 
he was in office, Arsyad was allegedly involved in the forgery of a letter that 
gave a seat of the House of Representatives to a losing candidate.
267
The 
scandal arose from the General Election dispute in 2009 between a politician 
from the People’s Conscience Party (Hanura), Dewi Yasin Limpo, and a 
politician from the Greater Indonesian movement (Gerindra), Mestariani 
Habie.  The Constitutional Court officially ruled that the seat should be 
given to Habie, yet Justice Arsyad collaborated with the Law Clerk to forge 
a letter to award a House of Representatives seat to the losing candidate, 
Dewi Yasin Limpo.
268
Chief Justice Mahfud decided to conduct an internal 
investigation into the case and found indications that Arsyad, the law clerk, 
and a commissioner of the General Election Commission had collaborated to 
forge the document awarding the seat to a losing candidate.  Chief Justice 
Mahfud then reported Arsyad’s alleged involvement to the police.
The disgraced Justice Arsyad launched a counter attack.  First, he 
revealed how Chief Justice Mahfud lobbied him rigorously to vote against 
Chief Asshiddiqie in the election of Chief Justice in 2008.  He then 
apologized to Chief Justice Asshiddiqe for siding with Mahfud and creating 
a plot to dethrone Asshiddqie.
269
Second, Arsyad accused Mahfud of being 
an incompetent Chief Justice because he neglected the Court’s 
administration and focused too much on building his popularity outside of 
court activities.
270
Lastly, Justice Arsyad accused Mahfud of breaching the 
judiciary code of ethics when Mahfud held a private meeting with an Anti-
Corruption Commissioner, Bibit Riyanto, and his lawyer while the Court 
was reviewing his case.
271
The truth behind Arsyad’s accusations remains 
unknown; nevertheless, Arsyad’s scandals and his counter attack tainted the 
reputation of Chief Justice Mahfud.  
267
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E. The Mahfud Court at Twilight 
On June 21, 2011, the House of Representatives enacted the 
Amendment of the Constitutional Court Law.
272
The amendment process 
itself went largely unnoticed, and thus, it created an impression that the 
House wanted to avoid public discourse on the amendment.
273
The new Law 
established the Honorary Council of Judges of the Constitutional Court, 
which aimed to supervise the performance of the Constitutional Court 
Justices.  The council members included some members of the House of 
Representative.
274
  The new law also prescribed that the Court’s judgment 
should not exceed what a claimant requested.
275
The then Minister of Law 
and Human Rights, Patrialis Akbar, explained that the Court would be 
forbidden from deciding a matter it has not been asked to make a decision 
upon, such as the nullification of a whole statute.
276
Moreover, the Law 
reduced the tenure of Chief Justice to two years and six months, implying 
that the House wanted to have more control over the Court.
277
The decision 
to reduce the term of Chief Justice signified that that position is quite 
important.  By reducing the term of Chief Justice, the House wanted to 
minimize the position’s influence on Indonesian constitutional politics. 
Chief Justice Mahfud responded positively to the new law and stated 
that the Court would accept it without reservation.
278
Moreover, Mahfud 
denied the possibility that the Court could review the new law.  He 
reaffirmed his old taboos that the Court should recuse itself when it had self-
interest in certain cases that involved the Court’s authority.
279
One plausible 
explanation for Mahfud’s compliance with the new law is that he was 
272
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seeking re-election as the Chief Justice.  In August 2011, Chief Justice 
Mahfud had to run for re-election, so he once again implemented judicial 
restraint in order to please the Executive and Legislative branches.
During his tenure as Chief Justice, Mahfud seemed to maintain good 
relations with his fellow judges and therefore did not face strong resistance 
during his re-election.  The Government also appeared tolerant of Mahfud’s 
behavior on the bench, and, consequently, Mahfud was reelected to be the 
Chief Justice until 2014.
280
It was therefore surprising when, in November 
2012, Mahfud told the House of Representative that he intended to leave his 
job in April 2013. 
There were rumors that Mahfud was a potential candidate for 
president in the 2014 election.
281
Therefore, his decision to resign, some 
believe, was part of his larger plan to run for president.  In response to the 
rumors, Chief Justice Mahfud said, “That is part of democracy.  So let it be . 
. . .”
282
On April 1, 2013, Chief Justice Mahfud officially resigned from the 
Court and reaffirmed his aspiration to run in the presidential race.  “If the 
opportunity is really there, I am ready to be nominated as a presidential 
candidate,” said Mahfud on his last day at the Court.
283
Mahfud’s 
presidential ambitions indicate that the position of Chief Justice is indeed 
important in the Indonesian Constitutional Court.  Mahfud has earned fame 
following his involvement in politically sensitive cases, frequent media 
interviews, and activities outside the courtroom.  In other words, Mahfud 
earned his fame by following in the footsteps of his predecessor Jimly 
Asshiddiqie, who played a role as a heroic Chief Justice.
Mahfud’s party, the National Awakening Party (PKB) had, indeed, 
considered him as a potential candidate for the 2014 presidential election. 
Unfortunately, the PKB only garnered 9.04 % of popular vote (i.e. 8.39 % of 
seats), which is far below the presidential threshold.
284
Having realized that 
it would not be able to nominate Mahfud as president, the PKB buried 
280
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Mahfud’s presidential ambition and decided to join the coalition that 
nominated the Governor of Jakarta, Joko Widodo as president.
285
Mahfud 
could not hide his disappointment and decided to support Widodo’s rival, a 
retired three star general, Prabowo Subianto.  In a dramatic turn, he accepted 
an offer to become the head of Subianto’s election campaign.  
In the presidential election that took place on July 9, 2014, Joko 
Widodo, commonly known as Jokowi, defeated his archrival Prabowo 
Subianto.  Widodo received 53.1 percent of the votes (71 million) and his 
opponent received 46.85 per cent (62.5 million).  Mahfud admitted that he 
had failed to deliver victory for Prabowo Subianto.  Subianto, however, 
refused to concede and claimed that he had been denied victory by fraud and 
immediately challenged the election result in the Constitutional Court.  Soon 
after the General Election Commission announced the official results of the 
2014 presidential election, former Chief Justice Mahfud resigned from his 
position as chairman of the Subianto’s presidential campaign team.
286
VI. MISCARRIAGE OF CHIEF JUSTICE: THE TRAGIC FALL OF AKIL MOCHTAR 
On April 3, 2013, the Court elected Akil Mochtar as the new Chief 
Justice for the period of 2013–2015.  Mochtar had no towering academic 
credential like his predecessors; he was a politician from Golkar Party, the 
former ruling party under the military dictatorship.  He began to serve as the 
member of the House of Representative after the fall of military government 
in 1998.  In his second term as the member of the House, he served as the 
Deputy Chairman of the House of Judiciary Committee.
287
In 2007, Akil Mochtar ran for West Kalimantan governor and lost.  
But his failure in that election became a turning point for his political 
aspirations.  In his bid for governor, Mochtar went against his own party 
candidate, the then Governor Usman Djafar.  Thus, Golkar Party officials 
saw Mochtar as a traitor that split Golkar’s vote, which resulted in his 
285
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loss.
288
Having realized that he would never be nominated for legislative 
candidacy again by Golkar, Mochtar lobbied politicians for consideration to 
be appointed as a Constitutional Court justice.  Five years later, he became 
the third Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court.
289
Akil Mochtar’s election is rather puzzling for many people, especially 
considering his poor record.  Akil Mochtar had long been suspected of 
involvement in corrupt activity while on the Constitutional Court.  In 2010, 
he was linked to a bribery scandal that related to a case involving an election 
dispute in the Simalungun district.  Refly Harun, the lawyer of the Head of 
Simalungun District accused Mochtar of receiving money from his client in 
exchange for a promise of a favorable decision in return.
290
The then-Chief 
Justice Mahfud established an independent ethics council to investigate the 
allegation.  The Ethics Council, however, did not find any incriminating 
evidence and cleared Mochtar of all charges.  Three years later, Mochtar 
could not escape from corruption charges when the Anti-Corruption 
Commission arrived with a warrant for his arrest and confiscated 
approximately USD 260,000 from his residence.  The money was allegedly 
given so Mochtar would rule the Gunung Mas regional election dispute in 
the incumbent’s favor.
291
So why did the Constitutional Court Justices elect Akil Mochtar as the 
third Chief Justice?  One of the plausible explanations is that Akil Mochtar 
was not the sole perpetrator involved in the corruption scandals.  Budiman 
Tanuredjo, the chief editor of Kompas, the leading daily newspaper in 
Indonesia, wrote a detailed report on the involvement of Akil Mochtar in 
multiple bribery offences in regional election disputes.
292
Under the tenure
of Chief Justice Mahfud, Mochtar sat on the same panel of judges with 
Justice Hamdan Zoelva and Justice Mohammad Alim that was equipped 
with the task of examining some regional election dispute cases.
293
Tanuredjo reported that in many instances Akil Mochtar received a bribe for 
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the Court to rule in favor of certain candidates.
294
The question is how 
Mochtar could steer the Court decision without the knowledge of his 
brethren who sat on the same panel.  After he became the Chief Justice, 
Mochtar shuffled the panel of judges that examine the regional election 
disputes.  Mochyar assigned himself to sit in a panel of judges with Justice 
Maria Farida and Justice Anwar Usman.
295
Tanuredjo reported that Mochtar 
received multiple bribes to issue a favorable ruling to certain candidates.
296
These facts lead into two different conclusions: first, Mochtar steered the 
Court’s decision in collaboration with his fellow justices who sat on the 
same panel; second, he received bribes alone, but he was able to use his 
insider position to advocate strongly for certain positions while the other 
judges were oblivious.
297
The tenure of Akil Mochtar as Chief Justice was short.  He reigned 
from April 3, 2013 until his arrest on October 2, 2013.  The arrest not only 
has tarnished the Court’s reputation but also eroded the Court’s legitimacy.  
Shortly after Mochtar’s arrest, an angry crowd ransacked the courtroom 
where a trial was being held.
298
  At that time, eight justices were reading out 
a verdict concerning a dispute of Governor Election in Maluku province.  
The supporters of the losing candidate stormed the courtroom and the 
justices immediately exited the courtroom after one of the angry supporters 
hurled a microphone at them.  Obviously, the attack signified the lack of 
trust from general public.  There would be a long way to go for the Court to 
rebuild its reputation. 
The disgrace of Akil Mochtar reached its climax on June 30, 2014 
when the Jakarta Anti-Corruption Court sentenced him to life 
imprisonment.
299
The Court found that Mochtar was guilty of corruption 
and money laundering during his tenure as an associate justice and Chief 
Justice, between 2010 and 2013.  The tragic episode of Akil Mochtar
signifies an important moment in the history of the Indonesian 
294
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Constitutional Court.  The Chief Justice holds a crucial position in the 
Indonesian constitutional constellation.  In his capacity as the Chief Justice, 
Akil Mochtar was the personification of the Court, and thus, the public could 
easily equate his personal crimes with the Court. Prior to the fall of Akil 
Mochtar, the Court had a reputation as a transparent and functioning 
institution.  Mochtar’s arrest, however, led the public to perceive the Court 
as another corrupt legal institution in the country, similar to the Supreme 
Court or the Attorney General’s office. 
VII. WILTING BEFORE BLOOMING: THE HAMDAN ZOELVA COURT 
After the arrest of Akil Mochtar, the Deputy Chief Justice Hamdan 
Zoelva took over the leadership of the Constitutional Court, and 
subsequently was elected as the fourth Chief Justice of the Constitutional 
Court on November 1, 2013.  Zoelva is a politician from the Star and 
Crescent party.  Like the first two Chief Justices who have strong Islamic 
backgrounds, Zoelva also has strong ties with political Islam.  His party, the 
Star and Crescent Party, claims that it is the continuation of Council of 
Indonesian Muslim Associations (Partai Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia
or Masyumi), a major Islamic political party in Indonesia in 1950s.
300
When 
the party was re-established in 1999 after the fall of Suharto regime, the 
original plan was to use the Masyumi name again, but after consideration, 
they settled on the Crescent Star Party.
301
Zoelva used to hold many 
strategic positions in the party.  He was the Secretary of Star and Crescent 
caucus in the House of Representative from 1999 to 2004 and was a member 
of its Executive Committee.
302
He resigned from the Party after President 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono nominated him as an associate Justice of the 
Constitutional Court in 2010.
303
When Hamdan Zoelva was inaugurated on November 6, 2013, he 
inherited a court in crisis. The biggest challenge for Zoelva was restoring 
public confidence in the Court after the tragic fall of his immediate 
predecessor.  The first test for Chief Justice Zoelva’s leadership was in the 
Presidential Threshold Case, in which the Court had to decide the 
300
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constitutionality of presidential threshold requirements.
304
This was even 
more significant because Zoelva’s appointment as the Chief Justice had 
drawn criticism from some political activists who believed that his 
background as a politician would only serve to weaken the public’s waning 
trust toward the Court.
305
This concern was based on the fact that a number 
of the Star and Crescent Party officials frequently argued before the Court.  
The founder of the Star and Crescent Party, Yusril Ihza Mahendra, a high-
profile lawyer and former Minister of Justice often argued before the 
Constitutional Court.
306
In the Presidential Threshold Case, many critics 
expressed concern that Chief Justice Zoelva might try to steer the Court 
decision in favor of Mahendra. 
The case arose because on December 8, 2013, Mahendra announced 
his candidacy for the presidency despite his party having no seats in the 
House and little prospect of fulfilling either the seat or popular vote 
threshold in the 2014 legislative election.
307
  According to the Presidential 
Election Law, a presidential candidate shall be nominated by a political 
party or a coalition of political parties who hold at least twenty percent seats 
in the House of Representatives or obtain at least twenty-five percent of the 
popular vote in the legislative election.
308
On December 13, 2013, 
Mahendra launched a legal challenge in the Constitutional Court to enable 
him to run for president on his party’s ticket, the Star and Crescent Party.
In his petition, Mahendra postulated that the Constitution did not 
specify any threshold for the presidential election. Mahendra referred to the 
Constitutional provisions that states, “each ticket of presidential candidates 
shall be proposed prior to the holding of general elections by political parties 
or coalitions of political parties which are participants in the general 
elections.”
309
Mahendra asserted that there were twelve political parties in 
304
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the 2014 election, and, therefore, he urged the Court to declare that all of 
these parties have the right to nominate their candidates for president.
310
On March 20, 2014, the Court issued a decision that addressed 
Mahendra’s complaint.  The Court considered that Mahendra had requested 
the Court to issue an advisory opinion in regards to the meaning of article 
6(2) of the Constitution.  The Court made a distinction between a declaratory 
judgment and an advisory opinion; the former aims to resolve concrete 
controversies and the latter does not.
311
The Court held that it had no 
authority to issue an advisory opinion, and thus that it could not grant 
Mahendra’s petition.
312
The Court’s decision signaled that it was on the 
verge of abandoning its old approach.  Previously, under both the 
Assiddiqhie Court and the Mahfud Court, the Court had not been reluctant to 
issue opinions in similar cases.  The decision was a signal that the Zoelva 
Court believed that the Court should play a minimal role in politically-
charged cases. 
The Court continued to signal its preference for judicial restraint in 
the recent Regional Election Dispute Case.
313
The Zoelva Court was also 
fully aware that the Court’s reputation has been tarnished by many scandals 
that originated from regional election disputes.  After the arrest of Chief 
Justice Mochtar, many constitutional stakeholders began to urge the 
President and the House of Representatives to reevaluate the Court’s 
authority to handle these disputes.  Nonetheless, neither the President nor the 
House took any steps to address the issue. The Zoelva Court thus took the 
issue into its own hands in its decision in this case.
The case originated from a claim made by a group of NGOs, chiefly 
led by the Law and Constitutional Assessment Forum (Forum Kajian 
Hukum dan Konstitutsi).  The claimants posited that the Constitution only 
equipped the Court with authority to handle national election disputes, not 
regional election disputes.
314
Based on this presupposition, the Claimant 
concluded that the Court’s authority to handle regional election disputes was 
unconstitutional.
310
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The claimants also put forward a claim that the Court had shifted their 
energy and resources to handling the regional election disputes instead of 
statutory review.  According to the claimants, the Court’s new priority 
caused immediate harm to them because it lessened their ability to bring 
successful statutory review cases.
315
The nature of the claim was very 
abstract and the petitioners were asking the Court to reevaluate its own 
authority to handle regional election disputes.
The Court’s majority sustained the claimant’s petition and held that 
the drafters of the Constitution never intended to include the election of the 
Governor and the head of district (Bupati) within the textual phrase “general 
election.”
316
The Court ruled that the drafters only intended to include the 
presidential election and the legislative election, including the members of 
the national parliament and the regional parliament.
317
The Court thus held 
that many regional election disputes are not within the scope of its 
authority.
318
This case marked the second time in less than a year that the Zoelva 
Court minimized its role in constitutional politics.  The Zoelva Court’s 
approach is a contrast to both the Assidhiddiqie Court and the Mahfud 
Court.  The Zoelva Court understood that the regional election dispute has 
created a tremendous burden for the institution.  The Court had been 
overwhelmed with the regional election disputes on top of a recent influx in 
statutory review cases.  From 2003 through 2008, the Court only received an 
average of twenty-five statutory review cases per year; however, since 2008 
the Court has received an average of eighty statutory review cases per year.  
In addition, the Court must also handle a large number of national legislative 
election disputes every five years.  In the recent 2014 legislative election, the 
Court received 702 national legislative election disputes.
319
Thus, the 
315
Id. at 21–22.
316
Id. at 60.
317
Id. at 59.
318
Id. at 60.
319
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Zoelva Court decided to remove regional election disputes from its docket 
entirely.
The latest evidence of the Court’s advocacy for judicial restraint is the 
Court decision in the MD3 Case.
320
The Case involved judicial review over 
Law No. 17 of 2014 on Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, Dewan 
Perwakilan Rakyat, Dewan Perwakilan Daerah dan Dewan Perwakilan 
Rakyat Daerah—the People’s Consultative Assembly, People’s 
Representative Council and Regional Representative Council, and Regional 
People Representative Council (“MD3 Law”).  The crux of the matter in this 
case was whether the winner of parliamentary election shall hold the 
position of the House Speaker.  
In 2010, the Yudhoyono administration prepared the MD3 bill, aiming 
to address several issues such as the reorganization of the Regional 
Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah or DPD).
321
  Since its 
inception ten years ago, the DPD has been considered the weak second 
chamber because its authority is limited to discussions of how a prospective 
bill relates to regional issues.  The second important issue that the bill aimed 
to address was the immunity of the members of the House of 
Representatives. According to the Anti-Corruption Commission, more than 
seventy-five members of parliament were detained and declared suspects in 
corruption cases in the previous seven years.
322
The pressing issue that the 
bill aimed to address was how to balance the effort to combat corruption and 
the immunity of the members of parliament. 
The MD3 Bill stalled for almost four years, until an emerging political 
situation in the wake of the April 2014 Parliamentary Election revived the 
bill. After the 2014 Parliamentary Election, Prabowo Subianto and his Red-
White Coalition, which controlled sixty percent of the seats in the 
Parliament, began to see an opportunity to manipulate the MD3 bill for their 
interest.  The main agenda of the Red-White coalition was to control the 
320
Decision, Reviewing the Law No. 17 of 2014 on the People’s Consultative Assembly, the People’s 
Representative Council, the Regional Representative Council, and Regional People Representative Council,
No. 73/PUU-XII/2014 (Constitutional Court, Sept. 29, 2014).
321
See Law of the Republic of Indonesia, No. 17 of 2014 Amendment to the Legislative Institution 
Law, arts. 163, 166 (MD3 Law).
322
Ina Parlina, KPK reminds govt to boost its budget, JAKARTA POST (Nov. 14, 2014), 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/11/14/kpk-reminds-govt-boost-its-budget.html.
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leadership of the House.
323
According to the old MD3 Law No. 27 of 2009, 
“the House Speaker shall be a member of the political party that garners the 
largest vote in the legislative election.”
324
As the winner of the 2014 
Legislative Election, the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) 
was supposed to hold the Speaker seat.  But the PDI-P had to face a big 
disappointment when the Red-White Coalition manipulated the MD3 bill 
during the lame duck session of the Parliament.  The Red-White Coalition 
successfully inserted an amendment that stipulated the House Speaker shall 
be elected by the members of the House.
325
On July 8, 2014, the House 
passed the new MD3 Law and it went largely unnoticed as all the eyes were 
focusing on the presidential election that took place a day later.  The 
Chairwoman of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle’s (PDI-P), 
Megawati Soekarnoputri and two PDI-P lawmakers filed a claim to the 
Court and asserted that they were unfairly treated by the new law.
326
The 
Chief of the PDI-P legal team stated, “Within only a month, they amended 
the Legislative Institution Law, so now the House speaker position doesn’t 
automatically belong to the election winner.”
327
The Zoelva Court again exercised judicial restraint.  First, the Court 
held that the PDI-P and its Chairwoman Megawati Soekarnoputri had no 
standing to file the case because they simply disagreed with the enactment of 
the Law.
328
Moreover, the Court held that the PDI-P was involved in 
discussing the bill in the House, which means that they already had a chance 
to express their disagreement during the deliberation process.
329
On the 
merits of the case, the Court decided it is the province of the legislature to 
decide on how to choose leaders in legislative branch of government.
330
323
Red-and-White Coalition Sweeps House Leadership Posts, JAKARTA GLOBE (Oct. 2, 2014), 
http://jakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/politics/red-white-coalition-sweeps-house-leadership-posts/.
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Law of the Republic of Indonesia, No. 17 of 2014 Amendment to the Legislative Institution Law,
art. 82(2).
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Id. art. 84(1).
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See Decision, Reviewing the Law No. 17 of 2014 on the People’s Consultative Assembly, the 
People’s Representative Council, the Regional Representative Council, and Regional People 
Representative Council, No. 73/PUU-XII/2014, at 60 (Constitutional Court, Sept. 29, 2014).
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http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/07/25/pdi-p-files-lawsuit-md3-law-with-constitutional-
court.html.
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Representative Council, No. 73/PUU-XII/2014, at 201 (Constitutional Court, Sept. 29, 2014).
329
Id.
330
Id. at 214. 
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The Court's holding on standing did not alter the Court’s recognition 
of generalized grievances standing; nonetheless, it signaled a slight 
departure from the Court’s standing precedent.  The Asshiddiqie’s Court 
used the standing doctrine as an avenue to review governmental policies.  
The Mahfud Court in some ways continued to apply a similar strategy and it 
did not see any need to alter the Asshiddiqie Court’s standing doctrine.  The 
Zoelva Court, however, turned towards judicial restraint and it had no 
inclination to play a tug of war with the President or the Parliament, as was 
done by previous Courts.  By holding that the PDI-P has no standing 
because already participated in the deliberation process in the House, the 
Zoelva Court indicated that the Court would not trespass the authority of 
legislative branch.
The 2014 General Election has provided many opportunities for the 
Court and Chief Justice Hamdan Zoelva to play important roles in 
Indonesian Constitutional politics.  These opportunities in some ways have 
become a blessing in disguise for Chief Justice Hamdan Zoelva to raise his 
own profile, especially in the recent Presidential Election Dispute case.  On 
July 22, 2014, the General Election Commission declared Jokowi and his 
running mate Jusuf Kalla as the Presidential Election winners by a margin of 
8.5 million votes.  The defeated candidate, Prabowo Subianto, however, 
refused to concede and claimed that he had been denied victory by fraud and 
immediately challenged the election result in the Constitutional Court.
331
Having spent more than three weeks reviewing the case, the Court rejected 
all of Subianto’s complaints and ruled that there was no evidence of 
systematic and massive electoral fraud in favor of Widodo.
332
The Court decision in the Presidential Election disputes has elevated 
Chief Justice Zoelva to a very public position.  Zoelva’s leading role in 
presiding over the trial has won not only praise by political observers, who 
called him “the man of the hour” as the Court handed down its verdict that 
day, it has also transformed him into a social media darling.
333
For example, 
331
Prabowo Files Challenge to Election Result at Constitutional Court, JAKARTA GLOBE (July 25, 
2014), http://jakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/news/prabowo-challenges-election-result-constitutional-court/.
332
Decision, Reviewing the Presidential Dispute between Prabowo Subianto and Joko Widodo, No. 
1/PHPU-Pres-XII/2014 (Constitutional Court Aug. 8, 2014).
333
Kennial Caroline Laia & Adelia Ajani Putri, For Constitutional Court Chief Hamdan, Justice Will 
Prevail, JAKARTA GLOBE (Aug. 28, 2014), http://thejakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/news/constitutional-court-
chief-hamdan-justice-will-prevail/.
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Zoleva raised to prominence among social media users for his appearance 
after the Court rendered its decision.
334
Prior to the Court’s decision in the Presidential Dispute, many critics 
were skeptical that the Court would be impartial in reviewing the case.
335
The concerns were based on the fact that Zoelva was a member of the Star 
and Crescent Party that supported the losing candidate Prabowo Subianto.  
In addition to Zoelva, Justice Patrialis Akbar was a member the National 
Mandate Party (PAN) and the Chairman of PAN, Hatta Rajasa was the 
running mate of Prabowo Subianto. Therefore, there was a concern that 
Chief Justice Zoelva, with some help from Justice Patrialis Akbar, might 
steer the Court decision in favor of Prabowo Subianto.  Chief Justice Zoelva 
responded to the critics: “Whatever I said, people would not believe me.  I 
had said repeatedly that the Court would be independent, but no one 
believed us.”
336
  Indeed, Chief Justice Zoelva turned the skepticism into 
delight by proving his impartiality.  
The rise of Chief Justice Zoelva in the public consciousness signifies 
that the position of Chief Justice is important in Indonesian Constitutional 
politics.  The public still believes that the Chief Justice is the personification 
of the Court, moreover, people have a perception that the Chief Justice 
might be able to steer the Court decision in a certain direction.  Although the 
Chief Justice does not have as much power as the public imagines, the Chief 
Justice can still influence the path that Court will take. 
Despite the success of Chief Justice Zoelva in repairing the Court’s 
image, the Court has been unable to fully recover from the major setback 
caused by Akil Mochtar. First, the Court’s advocacy of judicial restraint 
may be a sign of weakness, that Chief Justice Zoelva did not believe the 
court had the strength to overrule the Executive and Legislature. Second, 
the Court’s decision that upheld Jokowi’s electoral victory could also be 
interpreted as a sign of weakness because the Court was simply affirming a 
popular electoral result.  Lastly, Chief Justice Zoelva’s advocacy of judicial 
334
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restraint did not help him to secure his position, as the new President Jokowi 
decided not to re-appoint him for a second term.  Furthermore, Chief Justice 
Zoelva had to endure a humiliating experience in his effort to cling to his 
position.
337
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono appointed Hamdan Zoelva as 
an associate Justice on January 7, 2010, which means that he would finish 
his first-five year term on January 7, 2015.
338
As Chief Justice Zoelva 
approached the end of his first five-year term, the Jokowi administration 
hinted that Chief Justice Zoelva would not be re-appointed for his second 
term.
339
On November 11, 2014, President Jokowi established a selection 
committee to find a successor for Hamdan Zoelva. Chief Justice Zoelva 
implied that he was prepared to be reappointed if Jokowi wanted him to keep 
the position. When the selection committee opened a public competition for 
Zoelva’s position, Zoelva put aside his ego and applied for his position. 
Chief Justice Zoelva soon realized that the Jokowi administration 
would not give him an easy pass when the selection committee called him 
for an interview.  Zoelva sent a letter stating his objection to attend the 
interview with the selection committee. He said he had already fulfilled the 
requirement to serve on the bench when he was interviewed to become an 
associate Justice in 2010.
340
The selection committee maintained that Chief 
Justice Zoelva would not receive any special treatment and he could not take 
any shortcuts. The committee finally decided to drop the bid of Chief Justice 
Hamdan Zoelva.
341
This episode suggests that the Court was indeed weak 
337
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because Chief Justice Zoelva had to show submissive respect to the Jokowi 
administration, which eventually failed to save him from the sad ending.   
Some politicians and analysts accused Zoelva of not acting like a 
statesman in the battle over his appointment, as he simply wanted to cling on 
to his position as Chief Justice.
342
Regardless of the motivation behind his
decision to fight against the Jokowi administration, Zoelva raised some 
important concerns over the Constitutional Court’s institutional design.
Before he left the office, Chief Justice Zoelva urged lawmakers to reform the 
term limit for Constitutional Court justices and Chief Justice.
343
He argued 
that a longer term limit is necessary to preserve judicial independence. 
There is some truth in Zoelva’s proposal because if the appointment term is 
longer, the constitutional court judges would likely be more independent in 
exercising their authority. 
On January 12, 2015, the Constitutional Court Justices unanimously 
elected Arief Hidayat, a lesser-known academic from Diponegoro 
University, as the fifth Chief Justice of the Indonesian Constitutional Court.  
As the new Chief Justice, Arief Hidayat must reflect on what his future will 
look like and whether his career will end up like his predecessors.  It appears 
that Arief Hidayat did not learn any lessons from his predecessors.  Just 
barely one year in his tenure as Chief Justice, Hidayat shocked the public 
with indications of an ethics violation.
344
Hidayat allegedly wrote a memo 
to Widyono Pramono, the then Assistant Attorney General for Special Crime 
concerning Hidayat’s recommendation for Pramono’s promotion for 
becoming a Professor at the University of Diponegoro Law School, where 
Hidayat used to be the Dean.  In return, Hidayat requested for a special 
treatment of his “family member,” Zainur Rochman an assistant District 
Attorney at Trenggalek Regency, East Java.
345
The Ethics Council then moved to investigate the allegations of an 
ethics violation.  Hidayat admitted before the Ethics Council that he did 
342
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write the letter, but that he never intended to seek a special treatment for his 
“relative” who happened to be an assistant District Attorney.
346
Hidayat 
argued that he simply wrote in the letter, “I am entrusting you (Promono) to 
take him (Rochman) under your wing and to treat him like your son.”
347
According to Hidayat, what he meant by those words was a simple request 
for Pramono to be a mentor for Rochman in terms of improving his skill and 
knowledge as a young prosecutor.
348
The Ethics Council was puzzled by some of its findings, such as that 
Hidayat and Rochmat had just met in 2015 and they did not have any 
familial relationship.
349
The Ethics Council ruled that the Chief Justice 
acted imprudently by writing a recommendation for someone whom he just 
knew briefly.
350
Furthermore, the Ethics Council ruled that the issuance of 
the letter was an unwise decision because it might create negative 
perceptions.
351
Nevertheless, the Ethics Council did not find any gross 
ethical violations as Hidayat was acting in good faith to help a young 
assistant district attorney to gain some skill and knowledge.
352
On March 
2016, the Ethics Council came out with a recommendation that Chief Justice 
Hidayat be given private warning (sanksi teguran).
353
Regardless of the result of the Ethics Council’s investigation, 
obviously, Hidayat succumbed to alleged ethics violations, which could lead 
to a humiliating end of his career.  Although he did survive the investigation 
of the Ethics Council, he has tarnished the reputation of the Court that he 
leads.  As previously argued, the Chief Justice is the personification of the 
Court, and the public could easily equate Hidayat’s alleged ethical violations 
with the Court.  Hidayat will remain as the Chief Justice at least until 2017, 
but memories remain fresh enough for the public to perceive the 
Constitutional Court as yet another untrustworthy legal institution in the 
country.
346
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347
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VII. CONCLUSION  
When Indonesian politicians decided to establish the Constitutional 
Court in 2001, they did not intend to create a robust judicial entity.  The 
Court’s structural design clearly indicates half-hearted commitment to 
judicial power among politicians when they established the Court.  They 
designed the Court with limited authority, such that the Court could only 
review abstract cases and provide declaratory remedies.  The politicians also 
showed lukewarm support when the Court opened for business in 2003.  The 
executive and lawmakers did not provide sufficient logistical support for the 
Court and therefore it was without any money, an office building, and 
necessary staff upon its inception.  They opposed the proposal to build a new 
office building and the Court did not have a permanent office until 2007. 
Though political leaders intended the Court to be an innocuous 
creature, under Asshidique’s leadership it became something of a 
Frankenstein’s Monster possessed of the capacity to stand up against its 
creator.  It became uncontrollable.  Led by Asshidique, the Court struck 
down many governmental policies.  It pushed the government to respect the 
protection of civil and political rights.  Moreover, it even aggressively 
confronted the government to follow the Court’s decisions.  Asshiddiqie was 
not the government’s man, but was rather a maverick Chief Justice who led 
the Court to expand its authority and fought for its equal status with the 
other branches of government. 
One of the components to Asshidiqie’s success in leadership was his 
capacity to use the limited resources that were available to increase the 
power of the Constitutional Court.  The Court’s authority to exercise abstract 
review seemed to be a weakness for the Court because its job was simply to 
answer the constitutional questions presented to it. Asshiddiqie, however, 
turned this handicap into a powerful force in which he used abstract review 
to evaluate many governmental policies.  Under Asshiddiqie’s leadership, 
the Court struck down legislation and directed the government to correct 
several of its policies.     
Asshididqie continued to enhance the Court’s authority through his 
strategy related to questions of judicial standing, which filled an existing 
doctrinal gap with a broad vision of who may bring a case before the 
judiciary.  His expansive views on standing allowed plaintiffs to file 
petitions as taxpayers or consumers, and even bestowed standing on NGOs. 
Asshiddiqie believed that if the Court did not craft broad standing rules, then 
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many important cases would not come before the Court for review.  He was 
convinced that the Court had a role to play in solving political and economic 
problems in Indonesia’s democratic transition and therefore the generous 
view of standing enabled the Court to review many cases implicating 
political and economic issues in the transition.   
The Court’s aggressive approach aroused opposition in other branches 
of government and they tried to find ways to undermine the Court’s 
authority.  Though at first Jimly Asshiddiqie appeared to be the Indonesian 
judicial version of Frankenstein’s Monster, in the end he was easily 
overpowered.  The ouster of Asshiddiqie, indeed, signified the fragility of 
the newly established Constitutional Court.  Through this experience it 
became clear that the weakest point of the Court is the limited terms of the 
associate justices and the Chief Justice.  With such limited terms, the justices 
have to face the reality that their terms may not be renewed if they fail to 
please other elements of the government.  Moreover, the Chief Justice also 
sits on the bench with additional insecurity, since he or she might not be re-
elected to the position of Chief Justice if he or she fails to please the 
government or the other associate justices.   
The departure of Jimly Asshiddiqie, however, did not automatically 
bring to an end the “conundrum” posed by a heroic Chief Justice. His 
successor, Mohammad Mahfud came with a vision of judicial restraint, and 
indeed his Court tended to defer to the government on some major policy 
issues.  Nevertheless, Mahfud was unable to avoid the reality that his Court 
must review some governmental policies and offer directions to the 
government on correcting its policies when necessary.  He also had to follow 
the footsteps of his predecessor in defending and promoting the Court’s 
decisions through extrajudicial strategies such as media interviews and 
public statements on sensitive topics.  
The paradox of judicial leadership in the Indonesian Constitutional 
Court is that the Court cannot avoid politically sensitive cases because it has 
jurisdiction to review the constitutionality of laws and government policies.  
The Court will always deal with constitutional issues that have powerful 
impact on the political realm.  Consequently, the Court needs the leadership 
of a heroic Chief Justice who can command the institution in the sometimes 
stormy waters of constitutional politics.  Chief Justices Ashiddiqie and 
Mahfud might be gone from the Constitutional Court, but their leadership 
examples remain relevant and necessary for the fragile Constitutional Court 
that still needs a heroic Chief Justice at its helm.
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Although Asshiddiqie and Mahfud were dissimilar in many ways,
they had similar political trajectories.  Both Asshiddiqie and Mahfud had 
been constitutional law professors with deep Islamic roots before they were 
thrust into the role of Chief Justice.  They both had established decorated 
political careers before they came to the bench.  Both of them retained their 
interest in politics while they were sitting on the bench and they deployed 
some aggressive strategies in dealing with the different branches of 
government.  When they saw disregard for their decisions, they tried to 
launch a counter attack and push the executive and legislators to comply 
with their decision.  They both played the role of the heroic Chief Justice 
ready to solve the social and political problems in the country.
Asshiddiqie’s aggressive approach aroused opposition in other 
branches of government and they tried to find ways to undermine the 
Court’s authority.  The government did not have direct power to remove the 
Chief Justice; nevertheless, it could support rival justices to replace 
Asshiddiqie.  Those new justices were the ones who challenged 
Asshiddiqie’s leadership and ousted him from his leadership position.  
Unlike his predecessor, Mahfud was able to survive and he managed to 
reduce any risk of attack.  He retained some trust from his fellow associate 
justices that enabled him to finish his term as Chief Justice.  Nevertheless, 
Mahfud did not shy from showing his ambition to run as a presidential 
contender, which eventually led to his early departure from the Court. 
In both cases, the stars of Asshiddiqie and Mahfud were dimming 
after their departure as they both failed to return to power after they tried to 
obtain their political aspirations. Asshiddiqie failed to secure the top post of 
Anti-Corruption Commission and Mahfud could not secure the presidential 
nomination.  In his attempt at a political career comeback, Mahfud took a 
job as the Head Campaign Manager for a Presidential Candidate, Prabowo 
Subianto.  But Mahfud’s political comeback quickly diminished after 
Subianto suffered a humiliating defeat in the 2014 presidential election. 
Finally, the short tenures of Akil Mochtar and Hamdan Zoelva proved 
the Chief Justice still holds a crucial position in the Indonesian constitutional 
constellation.  As the Chief Justice, Akil Mochtar was the personification of 
the Court and the public easily equated his personal crimes with the Court. 
His arrest immediately led public perception to put the Court in the same 
level as other corrupt legal institutions in the country.  The public skepticism 
over the election of Chief Justice Zoelva reaffirms the importance of Chief 
Justice in the Indonesian Constitutional politics.  The public still has a 
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perception that the Chief Justice might be able to steer the Court’s decisions 
in a certain direction.  When Chief Justice Zoelva turned the public 
skepticism into delight by proving his impartiality, the public immediately 
stood behind him.  Nevertheless, Chief Justice Zoelva could not continue to 
play the role of a heroic Chief Justice. During his short tenure, Zoelva 
pursued a path of judicial restraint, underscoring the Court’s weakness in 
relation to other branches of government. Moreover, his advocacy of judicial 
restraint failed him in the long run as it did not secure his position on the 
Court. As President Jokowi decided not to re-appoint Hamdan Zoelva, he 
was forced to exit the Court in a sad ending like his predecessors. 
More than a decade after its inception, the Indonesian Constitutional 
Court still needs a heroic Chief Justice who can lead the institution in 
navigating the “stormy seas” of constitutional politics in Indonesia.  The 
professional profile and background of a Chief Justice is one of the key 
factors that affect the rise and fall of judicial power in the Indonesian 
Constitutional Court.  With frequent configuration changes due to normal or 
irregular mechanisms in the Court, there are no longer any judicial heroes 
available.  Under this circumstance, the Court and its Chief Justice must 
decide whether it will continue to be an engine for change, or whether it will 
allow itself to be limited to the small scope envisioned for it by the 
legislature when it created the Court in 2003.
   
 
